Strengthening the Rules-Based International Order

2020 Global Trends Report

An Anthology of Briefing Notes by Graduate Fellows at the Balsillie School of International Affairs
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The Foreign Policy Research and Foresight Division at Global Affairs Canada is proud to support and be associated with the Graduate Fellowship Program/Young Thinkers on Global Trends Initiative. The challenges facing Canada today are unprecedented and truly global. Tackling those challenges require fresh ideas and engagement with new generations of thinkers, researchers, and activists to help create opportunities for a sustainable future. We would like to thank the students and professors of the Balsillie School of International Affairs for their time, effort and commitment throughout the year to make this initiative successful. The results of their work, which has been encapsulated in this anthology, will help inform the work of Global Affairs Canada as it relates to foreign policy, trade and international development.
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Introduction

The last few years have been challenging for the rules-based international order of the post-World War II era. The institutions and laws that make up the global order have come under assault from a global tidal wave of nationalism and great power *realpolitik* that favours sovereignty and isolationism over international cooperation and multilateralism. For example, the international trade regime that liberalized much of the global economy has been challenged by a series of protectionist trade disputes — notably the tariff war between the United States and China — that, if left unresolved, threaten to push the global economy into recession. On the security front, despite pressure from Europe, Iran announced that it would withdraw from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or “Iran nuclear deal” as the US had done the year before, thereby weakening the non-proliferation regime and with it global peace and stability. And the future of the European integration project — perhaps the greatest multilateral initiative of the post-World War II era — remained in doubt as the United Kingdom continued to press ahead with plans to leave the European Union, with or without a withdrawal agreement in place. And in July, the United Nations reported that “progress” on the Sustainable Development Goals has been “slow or even reversed.”

While the rules-based international order may be bending under the strain of events of the last year, it is hardly broken. Far from it. Despite the worrying resort to protectionism in the United States, world trade reached a record US$19.5 trillion dollars in 2018, 25 percent above the pre-global financial crisis level in 2008. Following the Christchurch massacre in New Zealand, several governments began to coordinate activities to combat violent extremism online and have enjoyed some success in holding social media companies accountable for the content on their platforms. Activists around the world celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the Stonewall riots that marked the beginning of the gay rights movement, while Botswana’s High Court decriminalized homosexuality between consenting adults, marking a major victory for transnational LGBTQ+ equality rights. Inspired by 16-year-old Swedish high school student and climate activist Greta Thunberg, citizens around the world participated in global climate strikes to pressure world leaders to take urgent action to combat climate change. Even in 2019, global governance is still possible.

But if the rules-based international order is to only bend and not break, countries like Canada must demonstrate that it is the order, and not the alternatives mentioned above, that offers the best hope for securing a peaceful and prosperous future that benefits all of humanity. If this is to happen — if the rules-based international order is to remain humanity’s preferred system of global governance — new ideas and fresh thinking are needed.

This anthology of policy briefs aspires to offer just that: new ideas and fresh thinking. *Strengthening the Rules-based International Order: 2020 Global Trends Report* is the output of the 2018-2019 Graduate Fellowship program, a professional development program that cultivates and develops our students’ research and policy analysis skills. It is the fourth anthology in our series of trends reports, following on last year’s report *Discord and Disruption: 2019 Global Trends Report.*

Section 1: Human Rights and Development in a Digital Age explores how Canada can help modernize the global human rights and development regimes for the twenty-first century. Section 2: Urbanization and Migration suggests various ways in which Canada can assist with international efforts to govern the mass movements of peoples within countries and across international borders. Section 3: Trade and Environment offers recommendations for diversifying Canadian trade, promoting clean energy, and advancing
climate-compatible international assistance. Finally, Section 4: Security in a Turbulent World proposes novel solutions for reinvigorating peacekeeping and preserving peace in the Asia-Pacific region.

The anthology is the product of a very successful partnership between the Balsillie School of International Affairs (BSIA) and Global Affairs Canada (GAC) that is now in its fourth year. We are deeply indebted to the Strategic Planning Bureau at GAC for their many contributions to the BSIA-GAC collaboration, particularly to Manual Mulas for coordinating the program for GAC and organizing the day of briefings in Ottawa. Along with Manuel, we would also like to thank Caroline Coleman, Jordan Guthrie and Susan Hough for taking time out of their busy schedules to travel to Waterloo in February to meet with students. And last but not least, we’d like to thank the many GAC officials (some of whom were BSIA alumni) who attended and contributed to the day of presentations in June.

Special thanks to Carol Bonnett and Melodie Wakefield of the Publications Department at the Centre for International Governance Innovation for all of their work getting this anthology to press.

We would also like to thank the many BSIA faculty, mentors and staff who worked with the students throughout the year, including Dr. Roy Norton of GAC, who joined BSIA in January as the School’s inaugural diplomat-in-residence.

Finally, thank you to our graduate students for once again proving that some of the most innovative thinking on global issues is happening in Waterloo, Canada.

John Ravenhill  Andrew Thompson
Director, BSIA  Fellow, BSIA
Human Rights and Development in a Digital Age
Human Rights in the Digital Age: Inclusive Policies on Data Privacy

Violette Khammad, Bryn McAuley, Sarah Murray and Naomi Pearson

Issue

States and corporate actors are using new technologies to commit mass human rights violations, and existing international human rights norms, laws and enforcement mechanisms are insufficient to protect vulnerable populations in the digital age.

Background

The ongoing digital transformation is having a profound impact on human rights. While human rights norms and laws recognize the right to privacy, the global human rights regime was not designed to protect people from the advanced surveillance tactics and technologies used today by state and corporate actors (United Nations General Assembly [UNGA] 2014). More specifically, it was not designed to protect against violations that are enabled by the rampant collection of personal data, the abuse of geolocation technologies, the interference into personal communications and other rapidly advancing surveillance techniques, such as targeted acts of violence and other breaches of the security of the person (ibid.).

The protection of privacy — particularly the privacy of marginalized communities — will be the focus of this brief. This briefing note will make recommendations for strengthening the international human rights regime in five areas: advancing new international law protecting the right to privacy; enhancing the capacities of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) and United Nations Special Procedures to address digitally enabled violations; updating UN Guiding Principles (UNGPs) assessment tools to include violations against vulnerable populations; championing a global certification scheme for the private tech sector; and amending the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to include corporate actors.

Each recommendation is informed by the Canadian government’s dedication to gender inclusivity via Gender-based Analysis Plus (GBA+) policies and is intended to help Global Affairs Canada advance its top two priorities: strengthening the rules-based international order and furthering a feminist foreign policy.

Human Rights Violations in the Digital Age

There is an urgent need for an inclusive approach to protecting human rights in the digital age. Many states — democratic and non-democratic — are already forging ahead with mass state surveillance systems, some of which specifically target vulnerable minority populations. China’s persecution of its Uyghur population is enabled by “wifi sniffers” that search for prohibited images by intercepting communications on personal devices (Zand 2018).

Intelligence services in the United States and the United Kingdom have developed technologies providing access to massive quantities of private online communications (UNGA 2014). In addition, corporations are also acting independently in collecting vast troves of user data for advertising purposes while failing to protect user privacy. The US Federal Trade Commission is presently reviewing persistent breaches of user privacy by Facebook (Electronic
Privacy Information Center 2019), whose platform was also used to broadcast the Christchurch massacre (Willsher 2019) and facilitate genocide and mass atrocities in Myanmar (Mozur 2018).

**Current Governance Models**

There is little consensus among the major players as to which model of data governance should be adopted. While the global community acknowledges the need for the regulation of state and private actors’ use of digital technologies, there are differing opinions as to what form these regulations should take. In 2018, the European Union implemented the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) — a supranational law that governs companies that market online goods or services to EU citizens, regardless of where the company itself is located (De Groot 2019). The United States has traditionally adopted voluntary privacy regulations; however, there is a growing chorus of voices calling for greater regulation. California has recently implemented strict privacy-based legislation and US-based tech giants such as Google and Apple have advocated for comprehensive federal privacy legislation (Pichai 2019; Meyer 2018). China has developed a far-reaching regulation similar to the GDPR that applies only to private actors and is pseudo-voluntary (Sacks 2018). However, the Chinese government has prioritized national security over privacy and human rights and engages in mass state surveillance of its citizens (Dholakia and Wang 2019). One danger is that a model that only regulates private actors while exempting the state from regulation may be attractive to other illiberal and authoritarian states. Such an outcome would not be in Canada’s interest; hence, the need to strengthen international human rights laws and norms in order to protect the right to privacy.

A prevailing concern among states and businesses is that strong regulation will come at the cost of innovation and profit. Innovation Minister Navdeep Bains and Privacy Commissioner Daniel Therrien reject the narrative that data regulation is a zero-sum game (Soloman 2018). The Canadian public has indicated a desire for greater privacy protections (Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada 2016). As such, it is in the corporate interest to provide platforms that guarantee these protections for consumers.

**International Law, Enforcement Mechanisms and the Right to Privacy**

Currently, there is no comprehensive international treaty regulating state-led surveillance. In 2018, the UN Special Rapporteur on Privacy released a Working Draft Legal Instrument on Government-led Surveillance and Privacy. One possibility is for the legal instrument to take the form of a guiding principle, but the Special Rapporteur and other key stakeholders prefer that it form the foundation for a future international treaty (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights [OHCHR] 2018b). The treaty would apply to all law enforcement and intelligence agencies and would expressly prohibit arbitrary or unlawful surveillance. The draft text underscores that states must never target populations for surveillance on the basis of gender, religion, political opinion or other immutable characteristics. Canada’s engagement with the treaty-drafting process could ensure that the text makes explicit mention of respect for diversity and inclusivity, and that the text notes the particular risks of state surveillance for women, girls and LGBTQ+ populations. The European Union was the key financial benefactor for the current draft and would be a crucial ally for Canada in promoting the adoption of the text as a treaty through the UN system.

Nonetheless, the adoption of new international human rights law is often a lengthy process that can take years, even decades. In the immediate term, Canada possesses the ability to strengthen the right to privacy via the UPR and the Special Procedures. With respect to the former, the protection of privacy has been evaluated in some states’ reviews. However, this has not been done consistently. Similarly, digital privacy rights are being incorporated within some UN Special Procedures. For example, in 2018, the Special Rapporteur on violence against women released a report on web-based gender violence (Human Rights Council 2018). The Special Rapporteur on poverty has also made statements about the disproportionate impact of unregulated digital technologies on the poor (OHCHR 2018a). As with the UPR, not every monitoring body considers violations of privacy and its effect on vulnerable populations in their reviews. Granted, there are limits to what the UPR and UN Special Procedures can achieve. Neither represents a panacea that will guarantee the right to privacy. However, they remain important and legitimate vehicles for establishing new norms and improving human rights observance.
Private Actors and Respect for Human Rights: Innovative Approaches

Currently, private actors are governed through voluntary frameworks that attempt to influence their business practices. The UNGPs are used by large companies to report annually on their compliance with human rights norms via the SHIFT reporting framework. Neither the UNGP nor the Shift assessment database includes criteria protecting LGBTQ+ rights in their reporting. No other marginalized communities are included, and specific questions addressing gender equality and women's rights are not incorporated in reporting criteria regarding privacy and the protection of personal data (Shift 2019).

Similarly, certification schemes are a potential avenue to incentivize corporations to adopt human rights norms while encouraging innovation. The European Data Protection Certification (EDPC) is currently being tested among EU member states and is derived from the processes of the GDPR. However, the EDPC only certifies companies within EU member states, creating a gap among the remaining global community. Additionally, the EDPC is an opt-in process that only covers micro, small- and medium-level companies and, thus, does not incentivize larger companies such as Facebook or Google to participate. Still, although the EDPC is yet to be fully tested, it has great potential. Along with European allies, Canada is in an excellent position to champion a global certification scheme supported by the UNGP and a civil society reporting organization like Shift. By doing so, the certification would come with built-in brand recognition and a set standard of human rights observance, discouraging copycats who might wish to cheat the system and create their own certification in order to appear ethical without modifying their behaviour.

While voluntary standards can offer incentives for corporate compliance with human rights, they are ultimately insufficient for addressing corporate complicity in mass atrocities. There is a strong need to expand the purview of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to include private actors. This would allow for the prosecution of senior business leaders whose companies perpetrate and enable mass atrocity crimes. Of course, expanding the scope of international criminal justice is a long-term objective and would undoubtedly face fierce resistance. However, the ease with which hate can be spread over social media — sometimes with fatal consequences — requires a bold response. Twenty years ago, Canada, along with like-minded allies and the Coalition for an International Criminal Court, led the charge to establish the International Criminal Court (ICC). Given this legacy, Canada is uniquely placed to lead efforts to expand the ICC’s jurisdiction to include corporate actors.

Next Steps

There is an opportunity for Canada to mobilize support for inclusive, human rights-based international data and privacy regulation. Outside of the recommendations below there are further areas of interest for Global Affairs to consider in pursuit of global data governance. International forums such as the Group of Seven and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development are additional avenues for Canada to lead and promote a GBA+ approach to data protection. To that effect, Canada recently attended a summit hosted by France and New Zealand on combatting online hate (Willsher 2019). To realize its priorities of strengthening the rules-based international order and supporting feminist foreign policy, it is crucial that Canada continues to participate and even take the lead in these discussions.

Recommendations

1. **Lead in the adoption of the UN Draft Legal Instrument on Government-led Surveillance and Privacy.** Canada is well-positioned to ensure the incorporation of gender inclusive language within the treaty text and champion the adoption of the treaty within the UN system. Recommending a low threshold for ratification — such as 20 states (the threshold for the Convention on the Rights of the Child) — would help prevent opposing states from delaying the treaty's adoption.

2. **Introduce a resolution at the Human Rights Council to mainstream the right to privacy in the Universal Periodic Review and the UN Special Procedures.** Canada should call for having every state's Universal Periodic Review assess data privacy protections. It should also lead efforts to expand the mandates of all Special Procedures in order to ensure that digital privacy rights are considered from multiple lenses, for example, acknowledging the effect of technology on gender-based violence.
3. Lead an international effort to update the reporting mechanism for the UNGPs Assessment Framework to require inclusivity and intersectionality via the Shift disclosure database. Shift currently works with over 130 companies worldwide in order to facilitate human rights reporting within the private sector. Canada should work with Shift to incorporate intersectional reporting on gender and LGBTQ+ perspectives in the private sector.

4. Champion a global certification scheme modelled from the EU’s European Data Protection Certification. It is in the best interest of Canadians to support further cooperation between the private sector, civil society and government in order to better protect their privacy. Endorsing a global certification scheme, facilitated by the UNGP and a civil society organization such as Shift, would incentivize private actors to be active and enthusiastic participants in protecting human rights.

5. Advocate for an expansion of the jurisdiction of the ICC to include private actors. Considering the expansive capability of social media platforms to violate privacy, spread hate speech and incite violence, as seen in the recent mass atrocities in Myanmar, the persons responsible for these violations must be held to account. Expanding the purview of the ICC to include corporate actors would provide a mechanism for redress for victims of mass atrocities facilitated by tech companies.

About the Authors

Violette Khammad is a student in the University of Waterloo’s Master of Arts in Global Governance based at the BSIA.

Bryn McAuley is a student in the University of Waterloo’s Master of Arts in Global Governance based at the BSIA.

Sarah Murray is a student in the joint-Wilfrid Laurier University/University of Waterloo PhD Global Governance program based at the BSIA.

Naomi Pearson is a student in Wilfrid Laurier University’s Master of International Public Policy Program based at the BSIA.

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The Fintech Opportunity

Jamie Sgro, Peter Smalley and Nathaniel Welch

Issue

Despite a relatively weak domestic Fintech sector, Canada’s soft power advantages afford unique opportunities to lead internationally in crafting fintech instruments for gender-sensitive economic development and the achievement of multiple Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Background

The Fintech Opportunity

Despite having both robust financial and banking sectors and strong digital infrastructure, Canadians have not transitioned from traditional financial services delivery mechanisms to newer financial technologies with the same fervor as other countries. Fintech users account for only 18% percent of digitally active Canadians, lagging far behind adoption rates of global fintech-leaders such as China, India and the United Kingdom (69 percent, 52 percent and 42 percent respectively), as well as the global average (33 percent) (Watson and LaPlante 2018, 5).

The Canadian fintech market has significant potential for growth and innovation given the relative competitiveness of emerging fintech businesses and the capacity of financial hubs such as Toronto and Vancouver to attract and supply talent from domestic and international universities, connect start-ups with incubator/accelerator partners and facilitate access to Canada’s largest commercial banks. However, the state of the Canadian financial regulatory environment poses a serious threat to the realization of the fintech sector’s prospects. The proliferation of the fintech sector has dramatically outpaced policy and has created an environment in which fintech businesses operate outside the current financial regulatory framework (Watson and LaPlante 2018). The introduction of the Regulatory Sandbox Initiative (RSI) by the Canadian Securities Administrators in 2017 attempted to provide fintech start-ups a more flexible regulatory environment to spur innovation and growth in the industry. While the RSI was a step in the right direction, the Canadian policy landscape is fragmented, and fintech firms remain constrained by factors such as the application of irrelevant banking-sector regulations designed for partnerships with larger banking institutions and ill-suited to the fintech industry (Toronto Finance International 2019).

Fintech for the SDGs

The Canadian government has committed to contributing to the realization of the SDGs alongside 192 other UN member states. Fintech is complimentary to many of the SDGs and specifically relevant to several SDGs, including: 1 (Zero Poverty); 5 (Gender Equality); 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy); 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth); 9 (Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure); and 10 (Reduced Inequalities). Fintech’s ability to facilitate public saving and investment, direct capital towards projects parallel to the SDGs (for example, renewable energy development), and enhance transparency and accountability in the financial sector are invaluable to accomplishing the SDGs (UN Secretary-General 2018).

For example, the Kenyan bank M-PESA found that the mobile phone-based money transfer lifted as many as 194,000 households — two percent of the Kenyan population — out of poverty and has been effective in
improving women’s economic opportunities (UN Capital Development Fund. n.d.). In 2018, the United Nations announced the creation of the Task Force on Digital Financing of Sustainable Development Goals in order to “expand financial literacy” and leverage the benefits of fintech towards the SDGs (Fishman 2018). Fintech has been proposed as a way to address unequal access to financial resources for the world’s unbanked people. Unencumbered by legacy systems, fintech companies “… have the chance to build the right systems from the start” (Philippon 2016, 15). The digital revolution within the global economy has generated a need for fintech-based solutions to address existing and future economic concerns such as development, financial literacy and energy.

Pursuant to Canada and fellow UN-member states’ commitments to achieving the SDGs, Canada should also seek to engage key allies in leveraging fintech instruments. India and select African states such as Kenya offer especially promising partnership opportunities. India’s rapid proliferation of fintech users and positive diplomatic ties with Canada provides low barriers to cooperation, while the adaptation of fintech to supplement a lack of regional financial infrastructure in many African nations have especially high prospects as future global fintech markets. Multiple Chinese fintech projects are underway in Africa, including large-scale investment in African fintech, such as mobile payment-platform MFS Africa, backed by China-based venture capital (MFS Africa 2019). Canada should see states like Kenya as invaluable allies in pursuing fintech-led solutions to realizing the SDGs.

**Consumer Protection Matters**

Leveraging Global Affairs Canada’s (GAC’s) current infrastructural capabilities towards fintech should be a joint endeavour to locate affordable interventions in favour of fintech, while preserving its current mandate towards feminist international assistance (Tiessen and Carrier 2015). GAC’s international assistance projects represent a central opportunity to further galvanize fintech support in line with current projects related to digital inclusion, financial literacy and empowering unbanked households. Based on our research, since the year 2000, Canada has supported over 200 projects based in the banking and financial services sector through international development assistance. Based on a sample of these project descriptions, technical assistance has been provided to enhance the governance of the financial sector in countries around the world (Government of Canada 2019). These initiatives also strengthen multilateral cooperation on global fintech development projects with institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and the United Nations.

GAC has a particularly strong comparative advantage in its knowledge and expertise on consumer privacy and protection. Part of the adoptability of new technology is developing trust and institutional capacity to protect consumer financial records (Arner, Barberis and Buckley 2015). Through these international development assistance programs, Canada can provide training to institutions on fintech privacy considerations, help develop the infrastructure necessary to support consumer privacy, and could even help draft consumer privacy legislation that has worked well in Canada and can be adapted to local conditions. GAC could collaborate with the Department of Finance to develop these interventions as well as partner with other states and/or institutions to help provide this type of technical assistance on fintech consumer protection. This recommendation is backed by the finding that fintech use is positively correlated with information technology infrastructure, for example, a higher number of internet service providers and cellphone network capabilities (Haddad and Hornuf 2016).

Consumers are drawn to fintech because of the ease of access and low barriers to creating an account (Gulamhuseinwala, Bull and Lewis 2015). Customers who use fintech are looking for intuitive, convenient financial options that expand their financial choices. However, consumer protection should remain paramount. Protection-oriented policies should focus on the consumer level, not only to reinforce the stability of the sector as a whole through decreased volatility, but also to reduce predatory and discriminatory lending practices (Bartlett et al. 2017). In this way, Canada can support the financial safety net that fintech provides for the world’s unbanked and financially disadvantaged.

**Fintech Grand Challenges Program**

The “Grand Challenges” model is highly effective at directing companies, entrepreneurs, civil society and other actors to help each other find innovative solutions to big policy problems. There is a range of examples where this model has been used successfully. The Carbon XPrize is one such example. The XPrize is a global competition to develop breakthrough technologies aimed towards CO2 conversion. Another example is Grand Challenges Canada, funded by
GAC, to find innovative solutions to and technologies for global health issues. It has supported over 1,000 innovations in 95 countries. Like other initiatives, a fintech challenge fund for the SDGs could leverage private sector capital to be invested into solutions that create financial inclusion and create a network for collaboration and innovation.

A hybrid Grand Challenges model would work best for GAC’s purposes. The first element in a hybrid model would be an inter-state partnership, in which Canada seeks out another state to help support a specific fintech Grand Challenge. For the fintech Grand Challenge, GAC could seek out partners that have strengths in fintech and a similar desire to create positive global change. When potential partners are positively identified, GAC could form bilateral or plurilateral partnerships, provide joint funding for the initiative to spur innovations and investment, and work together to build a pipeline of innovations that could help solve one of the SDGs. A final winner could be selected and given a monetary reward.

Second, following the example of Grand Challenges Canada, GAC could provide Grand Challenges Canada with a separate mandate for fintech. Nothing in the existing Grand Challenges Canada model would necessarily need to change. GAC could outline four or five priority areas (such as female financial empowerment and financial inclusion) for those funds and direct Grand Challenges Canada to create the programs necessary to find solutions in priority areas.

Lastly, the hybrid model would foster the development of a fintech for a community of best practices and enable different state and non-state actors to share best practices in evidence-based policy and programming that leads to an overall improvement in fintech uptake and help solve problems on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Recommendations

1. Develop an International Fintech Grand Challenges Program.

2. Adapt and build capacity in consumer protection.

3. Engage key state and non-state actors and organizations such as India, Kenya and the Global Financial Innovation Network on fintech-development projects.

About the Authors

James Sgro is a student in the University of Waterloo’s Master of Arts in Global Governance based at the BSIA.

Peter Smalley is a student in the University of Waterloo’s Master of Arts in Global Governance based at the BSIA.

Nathaniel Welch is a student in the University of Waterloo’s Master of Arts in Global Governance based at the BSIA.

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International Assistance in the Digital Age: Fostering Health Data-Technology Partnerships

Ambika Opal, Cassandra Bangay, Laura Robinson and Vincent Vilaca

Issue

Canada’s health international assistance portfolio is primarily focused on addressing basic health-care needs in developing countries, but few projects take a long-term approach to health care that capitalizes on Canada’s unique expertise in health informatics and data management.

Background

Health Informatics

Health informatics describes the collection, manipulation and storage of health data, including all of the hardware and software used in these processes. The purpose of health informatics is to increase the efficiency and quality of health care. An electronic health record (EHR) stores health data and makes it accessible for multiple authorized users as a patient interacts with different aspects of the healthcare system over time (International Organization for Standardization 2005).

Countries facing health crises in the developing world are ill-prepared because they lack the ability to track health trends in real time and manage large amounts of information. Data collection can be performed on paper and aggregated centrally. However, this approach is time-consuming and inefficient. EHRs make it possible to back-up, access and share data at more than one site. Better accessibility of data means better management of chronic and infectious diseases, lower costs for health services, increased efficiencies and collaboration, and the facilitation of clinical research studies (Pantuvo, Naguib and Wickramasinghe 2011). EHRs improve patient outcomes by reducing medical errors and wait times, and improving utilization of lab results and drug ordering (Fraser et al. 2005).

A tangible example of how EHRs can save lives is the prevention, early screening and treatment of cervical cancer, aided by health informatics to track patient care and symptoms. In 2018, there were 570,000 new cases of cervical cancer around the world and 90 percent of resulting deaths occurred in low- and middle-income countries (World Health Organization n.d.). According to the World Health Organization, mortality rates associated with cervical cancer could be significantly lowered through screening, early detection and treatment.

Canada is a global leader in the development and implementation of successful EHR systems. Currently, Canada’s most comprehensive EHR system is Alberta Netcare, a province-wide intranet system that tracks immunizations, lab test results and prescribed medications. A single record exists for every Albertan and an online identification system is used to verify and protect their identity (Graham 2018). Canada currently has 30 graduate-level university programs in Bioinformatics, 34 in Public Health and a plethora of existing health-related
start-ups (Bioinformatics 2019). Canada Health Infoway, a Canadian non-profit that supports EHR implementation, has collected data indicating that currently, “100 percent of Canadians have at least one hospital clinical report or immunization record available in electronic form, and their authorized clinicians can access this information outside of a hospital” (Canada Health Infoway 2019). “93 percent of Canadian clinicians say that EHRs help them to improve their quality of care” (ibid.).

Canada is committed to improving the health and rights of women and children around the world in part by strengthening health systems to better respond to health challenges (Global Affairs Canada [GAC] 2019b). EHRs are a key element to ensure health systems are equipped with the information necessary to handle health crises and chronic health issues. At the Group of Seven Conference in June 2018, Canada adopted the Whistler Principles, reflecting Canada’s commitment to “1) Promote inclusive innovation, 2) Take intelligent risks by experimenting and 3) Collect and use evidence, including disaggregated data to drive decision-making” (ibid. 2018).

**Canadian International Assistance and Health**

Almost CDN$15 billion has been spent on health-related international assistance projects since 2000, and approximately 50 percent of these projects have been conducted in Africa (ibid. 2019a). A large portion of Canada’s international assistance portfolio is focused on addressing basic health-care needs, but few projects take a long-term approach to health care that capitalizes on Canada’s unique expertise in health informatics and data management.

Canada has begun to recognize the wide-ranging impacts that health data systems can create for women and children in developing countries. In 2015, GAC committed CDN$3.5 billion over five years to further support Maternal, Newborn and Child Health (MNCH) international assistance, specifying the generation of health data and systems as a priority (ibid. 2017). An example of such a project is the Real Accountability: Data Analysis for Results (RADAR) project run by GAC in partnership with Johns Hopkins University. RADAR works with several developing countries to collect maternal and newborn health information, digitize the information and analyze it to create evidence-based international assistance decisions. Canadian IT professionals are trained to create the tools and conduct the data analysis and the data are stored in Canadian repositories to ensure data security and quality standards are upheld (ibid. 2019a).

**The Data-driven Economy**

Data is quickly becoming the world’s most important resource. The global data economy is currently worth over US$3 trillion and is growing rapidly (Thirani and Gupta 2017). Canada is well placed to prosper in the global data economy due to its strong privacy laws, robust digital infrastructure, and growing technology and data analytics sector. However, growth in this sector is compromised by the ongoing “brain drain” — which describes the flow of home-grown data technology firms and professionals from Canada to the United States and other countries. For example, one in four Canadian graduates from tech-related undergraduate programs leave to work in the United States (Spicer, Olmstead and Goodman 2017). The San Francisco Bay Area hosts over 350,000 Canadians. Seventy-seven percent of Canadian tech companies expect to be acquired in the short term, mostly by foreign companies (Dasilva 2018). This “leakage” of firms and professionals has been catalyzed by recent trade agreements such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement, which prohibit restrictions on cross-border data flows and prohibit data localization requirements. These new rules make it easier for data to flow between Canada and foreign countries, creating incentives for data technology firms to follow the data outside of Canada.

Despite the obstacles that Canada faces in its transition to a data-driven economy, developing countries face a far more daunting series of challenges. Many developing countries do not have the infrastructure necessary to collect and manage data such as a reliable power supply, WiFi systems, the requisite software and adequate data storage. Moreover, many developing countries do not have the training or expertise required to improve their infrastructure and data systems (Odedra et al., n.d.). The regulatory environments in many countries are not conducive to participation in the global data economy, as many lack the data privacy and security regulations necessary for the safe handling of data. Improving data-related infrastructure in developing countries is crucial for their participation in the digital economy, as well as the ability of governments to harness data to create positive impacts for their citizens.
Feminist International Assistance Policy for the Digital Age

One of the “action areas” of Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP) is human dignity, which focuses on a number of key outcomes for women’s health and nutrition. The FIAP seeks to maximize the effectiveness of Canada’s international assistance by providing more integrated and responsive assistance; investing in innovation and research; delivering better reporting on results; and developing more effective partnerships (GAC 2019a). All four of these goals can be achieved by building health data-technology partnerships with developing countries where Canada uses its expertise in health informatics to bolster data and health systems in partner countries. These partnerships would foster evidence-based decisions in Canada’s international assistance portfolio and partner countries’ health sector, improve long-term health outcomes in partner countries, promote innovation in Canadian and partner countries’ data and health systems sectors, and deepen relationships between Canada and partner countries.

Potential Partner Countries: South Africa, Oman and Tanzania

This section identifies three countries that may be suitable partners for health data-technology partnerships. Partner countries should have the following characteristics:

- Existing international assistance ties with Canada;
- Existing proposal for a national EHR system;
- Stable national government; and
- Existing track record of ethical data usage.

South Africa (SA): In 2013, SA began to implement a nationwide plan to standardize both its private and public health-care systems by 2027. SA’s Office of Health Standards Compliance has been mandated to assess all 4010 health-care centres every four years to ensure that quality of care and medication prescription is standardized (Braithwaite et al. 2018). Currently, SA is in the process of developing a National Health Insurance scheme that requires the creation of a national EHR system (Katurura and Cilliers 2018). Canada currently has 20 active international assistance projects in Tanzania in the health sector, with a budget of CDN$489 million (GAC 2019c). Enhancing EHR systems in SA would ensure that all aid dollars are being used efficiently, and more citizens’ medical needs are being met.

Oman: Oman began its transition to EHRs in 2008 with the Al Shifa 3Plus system designed to connect Oman’s health-care networks as part of Oman’s national Health Vision 2050. However, the system has been plagued by numerous issues such as poor information and communications technology infrastructure, a lack of skilled IT professionals and data security issues (Al-Badi et al. 2015). Currently, Canada and Oman do not have strong international assistance ties, but they are both partners in several global health initiatives and could both benefit from health data-technology partnerships.

Tanzania: In 2017, the government of Tanzania published a road map for improving health-care data utilization by 2023 (PATH n.d.). It intends to strengthen and harmonize its EHRs and data usage by increasing investment in health systems and collaborating with development partners. Canada currently has 20 active international assistance projects in Tanzania in the health sector, with a budget of CDN$489 million (GAC 2019c).

Recommendations

1. **Place a larger emphasis on international assistance projects that develop data and health systems, focusing on EHR systems.** EHR systems are critical to improving health outcomes in developing countries and these projects address Canada’s FIAP goals. To accomplish this, data and health systems should be added as a separate priority in GAC’s global health international assistance portfolio. A strategic plan outlining Canada’s goals for international assistance in this area should be created. MNCH data and health systems funding should be renewed in 2020 when the current funding program is set to end. International assistance funding for data and health systems in general should be expanded, moving beyond only MNCH.

2. **Partner with developing countries to develop and implement EHR systems.** As part of this new data and health systems portfolio, Canada should work with national governments of developing countries to develop their EHR system frameworks and provide
some financial assistance for the implementation of these systems. These health data-technology partnerships would leverage Canadian expertise in health informatics and EHR systems, and would help create long-term positive health outcomes in partner countries.

3. **Enlist Canadian companies to help with system creation and implementation.** As many potential partner countries have limited information technology and data analysis capacity, Canadian firms should be involved in the creation of hardware and software tools for these EHR international assistance projects. The involvement of Canadian firms is a “win” for both the partner countries and Canada. Partner countries will benefit from Canada’s expertise in health systems and information technology, and Canada will benefit from creating more opportunities for Canadian IT and health professionals. More generally, Canada will benefit by becoming a global leader in EHR systems and health informatics, and by increasing Canada’s role in the global data economy.

4. **Encourage the creation of ethics and gender equality agreements with partner countries.** These agreements would create a framework for the ethical and gender-sensitive treatment of the data collected and stored through these projects, as well as a framework for the secure treatment of data. For example, the agreements may include provisions to ensure that data collected is proportionate to each gender and cannot be disaggregated in a way that would allow for discriminatory actions. These agreements would be in line with Canada’s FIAP.

Implementing these recommendations would leverage Canada’s unique expertise in health informatics to increase the effectiveness of current health-based international assistance, improving health outcomes in partner countries and providing benefits to Canadian firms.

**About the Authors**

**Cassandra Bangay** is a student in Wilfrid Laurier University’s Master of International Public Policy program based at the BSIA.

**Ambika Opal** is a student in the University of Waterloo’s Master of Arts in Global Governance program based at the BSIA.

**Laura Robinson** is a student in the University of Waterloo’s Master of Arts in Global Governance program based at the BSIA.

**Vincent Vilaca** is a student in Wilfrid Laurier University’s Master of International Public Policy program based at the BSIA.

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Urbanization and Migration
Rapid Urbanization and the Informal Economy

Alison Reiszadeh, Alana Westervelt and Johanna Wilkes

**Issue**

Informality is a central feature of today’s global economy and requires innovative, collaborative and inclusive policy solutions to support the two billion people who live, work and access goods informally.

**Background**

Urban populations and global markets are rapidly expanding, creating challenges for the formal sector to adapt and meet the needs of growing populations. In an attempt to keep pace with ever-changing labour market supply and demand, the informal economy has become the main livelihood strategy for urban dwellers. Over 60 percent of global employment is in the informal sector — in some countries, the percentage of informal employment is estimated to be as high as 93.7 percent (Uganda) and 88.2 percent (India) (International Labour Office 2018). With rapid urbanization, informality is becoming a central aspect of everyday lives. More than 740 million women worldwide are estimated to be working in the informal economy, with a high proportion of them located in low- or low to medium-income countries. With over half of employed women working informally, there is a need to support a feminist approach in order to understand today’s informal economies.

This policy brief will explore ways in which Canada can both contribute to the success of women working informally as well as enable productive dialogue focused on conditions of work and opportunities. Canada will need to work with its partners to find ways to support women regardless of the space of employment, informal or formal.

**Informality in Urban Centres**

Urbanization is a process often observed as a consequence of economic development. Today, 4.2 billion people live in urban areas. The world’s urban population is projected to continue growing, reaching almost 6.7 billion people by 2050, or about 68 percent of the world’s total population in that year (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2018). The rapid growth of urban populations creates substantial challenges for formal sector employment to keep pace. As a result, many of the new dwellers end up engaging in informal urban activities (Elgin and Oyvat 2013). Thus, for an increasingly large segment of the population, informal is the new normal. This phenomenon calls for urgent action on behalf of governments to support innovative, collaborative and inclusive policies to embrace this reality and harness the ability of the informal economy to meet the demands of rapidly urbanizing populations. As urban populations around the globe continue to grow, sustainable development depends increasingly on the successful management of urban informal economies.
Understanding Informality

Defining informality is perhaps a central question with respect to addressing its existence. The perception and language used to describe the informal sector bears significant influence over the associated policies and governance structures pertaining to informality. For example, in municipal urban planning agendas such as Accra Metropolitan Assembly’s, the terms “beautification” and “decongestion” are used as a means to govern public space through the displacement of “unauthorized structures” (Fält 2016). Thus, if governments are to promote decent work along the entire continuum from the informal to the formal end of the economy, it is critical to acknowledge the varying degrees in which people engage with the informal economy (see Figure 1) and the influence this can have on policy solutions. Understanding the underlying reasons for how and why people engage in the informal sector is critical in creating localized solutions. The informal sector should not simply be viewed as a strategy of last resort for those involved. Rather, the informal sector can provide enriching opportunities by allowing entrepreneurs an environment to test ideas and market demand for their products and services. “Labour unions and workers’ member associations are among the labour market institutions most critical to improving worker outcomes” (Jaumotte and Osorio Buitron 2015). Continued support of these initiatives is essential and in line with Canada’s commitment to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals — most notably Goal 8: Decent Work and Economic Growth.

Overrepresentation of Women in Informal Urban Employment

Women often face high barriers when trying to access employment in the formal economy. Therefore, informality is a key livelihood opportunity for many women. A study of Ho Chi Minh City in Vietnam by J. P. Cling, M. Razafindrakoto and F. Roubaud (2012) found that women represent 56 percent of all employment in the informal sector. This finding is not unique to the Vietnamese context. C. M. Rogerson (2017) highlights that within the African context informal street vending is a vital income niche for women. As shown in Figure 1, women not only are overrepresented in the informal economy, but also operate in situations of higher precarity (Chen 2012). It is important to further examine the roles women fulfill in the informal economy and whom it serves to benefit. The United Nations High Level Panel on Women’s Economic Empowerment (Klugman and Tyson 2016) highlights

Figure 1: WIEGO Model of Informal Employment: Hierarchy of Earnings & Poverty Risk by Employment Status & Sex from The Informal Economy: Definitions, Theories and Policies

Source: (Chen 2012; Permission to reproduce granted on July 25, 2019)
that the informal economy can perpetuate gender norms by limiting women to low-skilled opportunities that largely contain them to home locations or highly saturated sectors. In turn, this limits women’s opportunities for advancement through entrepreneurship. Thus, governance structures surrounding informality need to be established on the social and cultural context and not simply on normative arguments for embracing informality.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, 84 percent of women rely on vulnerable forms of work in the informal economy compared to 69.5 percent of their male counterparts (Iodice and Yourougou 2016). Research shows that the outsourcing of certain production stages actually contributed to the informalization of the economy in South Africa, leaving some of the most vulnerable groups, disproportionately black women, more susceptible to weakened labour conditions. This circular pathway of production tends to go between the informal and formal economies. The exploitation of the informal sector into formal sector activities, and the interaction back and forth between the two, is what has been described as the process of “churning,” which is in a large part due to “economic insecurity rather than material gain” (Meagher 2013). Kate Meagher (2013) cautions policy makers and scholars to be careful of the “regulation is good, and informality is bad” dichotomy. Crafting the right balance can be achieved through ensuring that policy works for women and marginalized communities rather than entrancing them into further spaces of instability.

Informality and a Feminist Approach

Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy states that Canada strives to “promote women’s economic rights and access to decent work” (Global Affairs Canada 2018). This statement is inclusive of support for meaningful policy reform and economic programming to address structural barriers and systemic causes of women’s marginalization in the workforce. The federal government has made it clear that empowering women and supporting inclusive growth are key pillars to the national development strategy.

Looking at the importance of how structural barriers can impede women in the informal sector is essential to understanding what options are possible in the governance of these spaces. These structural barriers manifest themselves in different ways across communities. In Mali, women account for roughly 91 percent of the informal workforce, where researchers found that it is essential to focus on equity and support networks such as female-led cooperatives (Iodice and Yourougou 2016). In Cameroon, the number of women working informally increases to 95 percent and it is often noted that women who take on additional work are unlikely to experience further economic empowerment (Fonchingong 2005). In Durban, South Africa, where nearly 36 percent of women work informally, it is noted that limited access to capital and poor home-work balance were identified as barriers to growth (Skinner 2006). Meaningful access to capital such as through micro-financing or female-led cooperatives continues to be commonly discussed options for female empowerment in all markets. It is important to focus on equity and normalizing female entrepreneurship to ensure that social and economic opportunities are equitable regardless of gender (Iodice and Yourougou 2016).

Recommendations

As a result of rapid urbanization and the expansion of the informal economy, different governance approaches have emerged to address increasing levels of informality. As noted by the International Labour Organization (2018, 1), the main challenge for governments and policy makers “is finding the right policy mix that corresponds to the diversity of characteristics and drivers of informality.” This highlights the need for context-specific understandings of informality that inform governance approaches and complements the vision Global Affairs Canada (GAC) has articulated in its Feminist International Development Assistance Policy to develop effective partnerships and to focus on regions where their work can have the greatest impact. These recommendations are targeted to three areas of governance: politics, policy and people.

Politics

1. Ensure consistent framing and principles are used when approaching the informal economy across policies and programs in GAC. If conceptual misalignment exists in the language used to frame and define the informal sector, it bears a significant influence over policy processes. Ensuring consistent treatment of informality can be challenging, however, when GAC works with partner countries, recognizing informality as a reality is the first step towards achieving inclusive empowerment.
Policy

2. Take cooperative approaches to understanding and designing regulation. Ensuring consistency in knowledge dissemination and localized communication strategies is critical to improve the social contract between the government and citizens. This will promote vertical policy consistency between all levels of government by articulating a common and consistent message and policy goals surrounding informality.

3. Create enabling environments for spatial planning and protection mechanisms that prioritize informal as the new normal. Creating space for informal vendors in formal urban planning processes is essential to ensuring continued access to space and protection of vendors who operate in cities across the world.

People

4. Expansion of existing GAC programs (for example, “Women’s voice in leadership program”) to amplify female voices and support women’s empowerment in leadership. Drawing on and assisting established rights-based organizations (for example, WIEGO) in developing countries, will support many of the recommendations for best practices presented by those involved in the informal sector. A starting point can be supporting groups of women who have been marginalized or have limited capacity to contribute to relevant policy discussions (Thapa Karki and Xheneti 2018).

5. Support existing informal unions and collective action groups. If the informal sector is to be successfully and sustainably integrated, it is imperative that governments help to facilitate each phase of the process. One vital component in this process is recognizing existing informal workers unions. GAC can help to provide informal worker organizations access to policy spaces, amplifying the voices and concerns of informal workers organizations. This creates room for those in the informal sector to effectively negotiate with the government and employers to secure the rights of those working informally. This will promote transparency and work towards the development of inclusive institutions.

About the Authors

Alison Reiszadeh is a student in Wilfrid Laurier University’s Master of International Public Policy program based at the BSIA.

Alana Westervelt is a student in Wilfrid Laurier University’s Master of International Public Policy program based at the BSIA.

Johanna Wilkes is a student in the joint-Wilfrid Laurier University/University of Waterloo Ph.D. Global Governance program based at the BSIA.

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Rapid Urbanization and the Informal Economy

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Alison Reiszadeh, Alana Westervelt and Johanna Wilkes
Xenophobic Populism in Europe and the Threat It Poses to the Rules-based International Order

Maria Almhana, Kayla Grant, Manuela Jimenez and Kristina Mastelica

Issue

Right-wing populist parties in Europe are co-opting anti-immigrant sentiments and utilizing the negative effects of globalization to create suspicion of and hostility towards elites, mainstream politics and established democratic institutions that threaten Canada’s core interests with key democratic allies.

Background

Xenophobic Populism Poisons the Well

The recent rise of populist parties in Europe demonstrates an alarming public response to decades of undemocratic liberal policies (Mudde 2016). Populism, while not inherently xenophobic, has in recent years taken on an anti-immigrant and illiberal tone, as political parties have co-opted the recent migration crisis in Europe, Brexit and anti-EU sentiment with the negative effects of globalization to create a suspicion of and hostility towards elites, mainstream politics and established institutions (Zakaria 2016). The populist surge is not unique to Europe; xenophobic populism will affect Canada too, as an alarming recent trend indicates heightened negative attitudes towards migrants (Global News 2019). Xenophobic populism spreads across borders, emphasizing the urgent need for Canada to act to protect its values and democratic institutions both domestically and abroad.

Populism generally arises amidst economic and social insecurities (Vieten and Poynting 2016). Populist rhetoric is anti-elite and portrays established institutions as “out of touch” with the common people. Populism further looks to establish scapegoats for society’s plight, often blaming migrants or foreigners as threats to the way of life (ibid.). Europe has struggled with populism since the 1960s, but only recently with the disproportionate effects of globalization has the phenomenon taken a radical and xenophobic tone, blaming both the European Union and irregular migrants as causes for economic disparity. States such as Poland and Hungary have elected right-wing populist parties that radiate anti-immigrant sentiments (Kalan 2018; Becker 2010). France’s recent surge of “yellow-vests” demonstrates the percolating populist trend even in liberal democracies, as citizens begin to turn against established institutions due to economic disparities (BBC News 2018).

Specific reasons for the rise of populism may differ, but there are four recurring characteristics that can be attributed to populism, regardless of political leaning. Described by Ben Rowswell (2019), populism is anti-democratic, despite claiming to be for the people, because it creates division, monopolizes the media, blames outsiders and dismantles institutions. These aspects of populism are harnessed by political parties to gain momentum among constituents because they blame current political elites, the established institutions and
foreigners as the reasons for economic and social woes, emphasizing nativist rhetoric (Vieten and Poynting 2016).

Xenophobic populism creates division, uses marginalized societies as scapegoats and resents diversity. As such, Canada has a duty to protect democracy and the rights and freedoms that are fundamental to Canadian values.

**The Retreat of Multiculturalism and Recent Trends in Europe**

The retreat of multiculturalism throughout the European Union has contributed to the rise of xenophobic populism. Since the early 2000s, a considerable backlash has been levied against institutional frameworks and political interventions designed to reduce discrimination, promote equality of opportunity, overcome barriers to participation in society and recognize cultural identities. Multiculturalism, once viewed as the cure for social issues, is increasingly viewed as the leading cause of Europe’s social problems (Malik 2015). This shift in perception has led a number of politicians to actively denounce multicultural practices: Angela Merkel in a 2015 speech called multiculturalism a sham, causing a backlash among right-wing and populist parties, such as the National Front in France and the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, that contributed to their xenophobic rhetoric (Noack 2015; Malik 2015). Despite the apparent public backlash, research shows that the supposed retreat of multiculturalism has occurred at the level of discourse, rather than at a policy level, with only immigrant multiculturalism seeing any serious repercussions (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). Political leaders and groups throughout Europe have capitalized on growing public distrust and anger towards migrants to generate anti-immigrant and anti-multicultural talking points. Their messaging is often factually inaccurate, blaming migrants for declines in employment and other societal ills.

Critics of multiculturalism have argued that rather than promote diversity, multicultural immigration practices have led to isolated societies and ultimately failed to assimilate migrants into their new nations (Noack 2015). Merkel’s denouncement of multicultural practices came at a time when the German public had grown increasingly wary of the influx of new refugees. Similarly, in France national identity and immigration have increasingly become more politicized, as seen in the creation of the Minister for Immigration, Integration, National Identity, and Co-Development in May 2007 and during the 2012 and 2017 presidential elections (Villard and Sayegh 2013). Questions surrounding the integration of migrants and criticism over the number of migrants allowed into the country have further weakened support for immigrant multicultural policies. The reduction of multicultural immigrant policies among EU allies has only served to further problematize longstanding challenges posed by increased flows of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants.

Recent trends indicate that France and Germany are “most likely” at risk of developing a populist government. Both states received a significant influx of migrants and asylum seekers during the 2015–2016 EU migrant crisis and have demonstrated difficulty in addressing migrant integration. Germany took the greatest share of migrants of any EU country over the past few years and became the world’s largest recipient of new individual applications, with asylum claims peaking at 722,400 in 2016 (The UN Refugee Agency [UNHCR] 2017). France became the fifth-largest recipient with 78,400 new individual asylum claims in 2016 (ibid.). As a result of the influx, there was a public backlash towards Merkel’s open-door policy to refugees (Tartar 2017). This backlash towards migrants can be seen in both Germany and France, particularly due to the lack of sufficient economic integration. In France, as a result of its nine percent structural unemployment rate, 15.4 percent of foreign-born individuals are unemployed (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] 2019a). In terms of social integration, indicators of unemployment and racial discrimination suggest that the French republican model of integration has become less effective as immigrant communities in France live in ghettos where there are high rates of violence, drugs and unemployment (Barou 2014). On the other hand, while Germany has better migrant economic integration than France, foreign-born unemployment continues to be higher than native-born, as it accounts for 6.4 percent of unemployment while native-born unemployment accounts for only 3.3 percent (OECD 2019b). Migrants in Germany also face a higher risk of poverty and lack of affordable housing (OECD 2018). Both countries have also suffered from high rates of hate crimes related to racism and xenophobia. For instance, Germany recorded 1,860 hate crimes related to racism and xenophobia in 2017 and France recorded 882 related to racism and xenophobia (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe [OSCE] Hate Crime Reporting 2017a; OSCE Hate Crime Reporting 2017b).
While neither Germany nor France currently has a populist party in power, both states have seen national populist parties gain considerable momentum in the most recent elections. In Germany, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) made history this year by becoming the first right-wing party to enter the Bundestag since the early 1950s (Tartar 2017). The AfD was able to double its voter share to 12.6 percent by challenging Chancellor Merkel's decision to let in around 1.3 million undocumented migrants and refugees, and pushing for strict anti-immigrant policies while creating anxieties over the influence of Islam (ibid.; BBC News 2019). France's National Front party gained a third of the popular vote in the 2017 elections by targeting globalization, Islamic fundamentalism and mass immigration (Tartar 2017).

Canada’s Role in Addressing Xenophobic Populism

Canada has consistently demonstrated a profound commitment to promoting multilateral diplomacy and leadership on international issues to maintain peace and security (Global Affairs Canada [GAC] 2017). This includes constructive engagement with like-minded countries in Europe to combat global issues and to encourage other nations to adhere to international law (ibid.). President Trump’s isolationist policies have created a void in the international liberal order that provides Canada with the opportunity to assume a greater global responsibility to protect democratic values and the rule of law. By forming an alliance with its like-minded allies, Canada can become an international “rule-shaper” (Daalder and Lindsay 2018).

Xenophobic populism limits the Canadian government’s ability in promoting inclusive policies. Canada and its democratic allies share a commitment to advance and protect democracy, freedom and human rights for mutual peace and prosperity (ibid.). Xenophobic populism threatens these commitments as the rhetoric emphasizes division and intolerance of marginalized societies (Rowswell 2019). Germany and France have traditionally been two of Canada’s strategic partners within Europe. There is an opportunity for Canada to lead constructive engagement with Europe in order to combat populism and promote peaceful pluralism, inclusion and respect for diversity. GAC’s mandate emphasizes expanding Canada’s diplomatic and leadership roles globally by promoting democratic values, emphasizing diversity and inclusion of marginalized societies, and protecting the rules-based international order by engaging in multilateral diplomacy (GAC 2018). Our policy recommendations aim to combat xenophobic populism by engaging with existing EU partners to protect democracy.

Recommendations

1. Propose the inclusion of xenophobic populism as a security dimension at the OSCE. Populist parties and authoritarian demagogues have gained power at a national level in Brazil, Hungary, Poland, the Philippines, Turkey and the United States, undermining democratic institutions and norms. This democratic backsliding is a threat to global security. With growing American isolationism, it is important that Canada engage with like-minded Western democratic allies to prevent the erosion of the international rules-based international order and promote democratic values abroad. The inclusion of xenophobic populism as a security issue would add an important element to existing security concerns and recognize the growing threat xenophobic populism poses to democracy and a unified Europe.

2. Create and lead a coalition dedicated to promoting and protecting the rules-based international order and democratic values. Inspired by Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay's concept of the “Committee to Save the World Order,” we propose that Canada spearhead a summit with its allies to encourage open dialogue that strengthens the rules-based international order (Daalder and Lindsay 2018). Through existing international institutions, Canada can lead a forum to promote and protect democratic principles that are being threatened by xenophobic populist rhetoric. By forming an alliance with its like-minded allies, Canada can become an international “rule-shaper” (ibid.). The coalition's purpose would be to combat the four tactics used by populist parties by encouraging strength in diversity. This would include promoting inclusion by offering open participation for states to join the alliance, emphasizing the economic and social benefits of migrant integration, and engaging in the development and maintenance of democratic institutions, such as the rule of law and civil society (Rowswell 2019).
3. Address xenophobic populism by developing a report that exposes political leaders and/or groups who espouse populist rhetoric. By naming and shaming, we can halt the normalization of xenophobic populist rhetoric. Canada has already demonstrated leadership in this area by naming Myanmar for committing genocide against the Rohingya Muslims (CTV News 2019). Naming xenophobic populist leaders, collectively with our allies, could be an effective tool to stopping populist rhetoric and holding governments more accountable for their inability to protect people’s rights. Following a model based on the yearly U.S. Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report, Canada should engage European governments to combat xenophobic populist rhetoric.

4. Recognize the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination’s (CERD’s) jurisdiction to receive individual petitions regarding alleged breaches of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. CERD has made numerous recommendations to Canada to make a declaration under Article 14 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which recognizes the jurisdiction of CERD to receive individual petitions alleging breaches of the Convention (Amnesty International 2012). We suggest that Canada follow this recommendation as it has set a precedent in accepting other individual petition procedures relating to other conventions such as the UN Human Rights Committee, the UN Committee against Torture and the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women to consider cases (ibid.). By adopting this declaration, Canada would demonstrate solidarity with other like-minded democratic European countries by ensuring their commitment to the fight against xenophobic populism at home as well as abroad, and enhance their leadership in the international world order.

About the Authors

Maria Almhana is a student in Wilfrid Laurier University’s Master of International Public Policy Program based at the BSIA.

Kayla Grant is a student in the joint-Wilfrid Laurier University/University of Waterloo PhD Global Governance program based at the BSIA.

Manuela Jimenez is a student in the University of Waterloo’s Master of Arts in Global Governance based at the BSIA.

Kristina Mastelica is a student in the University of Waterloo’s Master of Arts in Global Governance based at the BSIA.

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Global Compact for Migration: Gender Responsiveness, Implementation and Canada’s Role

Annalisa Lochan, Zoe Fortier, Britney Raby, Horacio Julian Venegas and Nawroos Shibli

Issue

How can Canada implement the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) as a gender-responsive instrument of global migration governance?

Background

The GCM is a multilaterally negotiated non-binding agreement under the United Nations. On December 10–11 2018, states present in Marrakech expressed their support for adopting the GCM. Subsequently, on December 19 at the UN General Assembly, states voted to endorse the outcome document from Marrakech. One hundred and fifty-two states voted in favour of adopting the document, five voted against and 12 abstained (UN 2018b). The purpose of the GCM is to facilitate safe, orderly and regular migration in a holistic and comprehensive manner. Traditionally, states have been resistant to taking a multilateral approach towards migration governance. However, the GCM helps facilitate meaningful international cooperation and engagement on issues relating to migration, and thus represents a watershed moment for global migration governance.

Gender in the GCM: The Feminization of Migration

About half of the people on the move worldwide are women (International Organization of Migration [IOM] 2018, 17), as are 44 percent of migrant workers (ibid., 28). Additionally, over 70 percent of domestic workers worldwide are women (ibid., 29). Women migrant workers experience a greater degree of deskilling relative to men and are concentrated within gendered sectors of employment that are subject to informality, a lack of regulation and a lack of social protection. Women migrants living, moving and working in these circumstances are subject to particular risks; for instance, 98 percent of all sexually exploited victims of trafficking are women (Canadian Women’s Foundation 2014, 17). LGBTQI+ migrants are similarly subject to a heightened risk of trafficking and sexual exploitation (Martinez and Kelle 2013, 1), and their concentration in informal and precarious labour sectors and domestic work is frequently downplayed or overlooked (see, for example, Lai 2018).

The GCM establishes gender-responsiveness as a guiding principle. It seeks to “ensur[e] that the human rights of women, men, girls, and boys are respected at all stages of migration, their specific needs are properly understood and addressed, and they are empowered as agents of change” (Global Compact for Migration, 2018). It also aims to
mainstream a gender perspective and to promote gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls by recognizing their independence, agency and leadership in order to move away from addressing migrant women primarily through a lens of victimhood.

Meaningfully enacting gender-responsiveness in the GCM will ensure that global migration governance also contributes to the realization of the Sustainable Development Goals, including Goal 5, gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls. Therefore, the GCM represents a watershed moment for cooperation on migration governance and working toward gender equality. It is a vital opportunity to build a rules-based international order for migration that truly applies to all, including the migrant women that globally constitute 50 percent of this group, rather than falling into old traps of essentializing women as victims or conflating them with children, while failing to responsibly address the gender-specific needs of women on the move.

Canada and the GCM

The emphasis on gender-responsiveness in the GCM has come about in part through Canada's push to place and keep gender on the agenda and to prioritize gender-responsiveness in all recommendations during the thematic consultations and negotiations leading to the adoption of the GCM. International engagement on the GCM has been jointly led by Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) and Global Affairs Canada (GAC). Going forward, Canada is well-placed to lead in international knowledge sharing and capacity building as the GCM is implemented. In so doing, Canada can live up to its recognition that “more work is needed to ‘walk the talk’ and reach the most vulnerable” on gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls both domestically and internationally (Government of Canada 2018a).

With the GCM in its implementation phase, Canada faces a significant opportunity to address the call from the Honourable Ahmed Hussen, Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, to develop a “planned, comprehensive approach to migration — with a diverse array of regular pathways for temporary and permanent migration, well-managed borders, and integration programming…” with “engagement of all levels of government, cities, educational and other public institutions, the private sector, community organizations and individuals” for a “well-managed migration system” (Hussen 2018) that can, in turn, be shared with international partners and enriched through cross-learning. It is now Canada's responsibility to build upon this foundation and incorporate gender-responsiveness more thoroughly into our migration system, through operational implementation of the GCM.

Methodology

To determine the extent to which the GCM incorporates a gender perspective, a detailed, quantitative and qualitative analysis of the zero and final drafts of the GCM was performed. We manually coded for key terms related to gender, guided by Gender-based Analysis Plus (GBA+), and recorded the frequency and the context in which they appeared, analyzing for each term's usefulness towards a gender-integrated, responsive outcome. In addition, we have examined public statements and official documents from the Canadian government, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General's office, and other relevant UN sources. Identifying the frequency and significance of these terms also allowed us to identify gender gaps in the document and determine the consequences of omitting gender-inclusive language.

Findings

The GCM reflects a clear recognition of the need for gender-responsiveness in migration governance. Indeed, gender-responsiveness appears as a guiding principle, and the term appears 21 times throughout the final draft. Awareness of broad issues relating to health care and social protection, which each appear seven times in the final draft, is also thoroughly established.

Gaps

Despite the promising start, however, some major gaps remain. While there is no lack of gender mentioned in the GCM, there remains a disproportionate emphasis on victimhood and dependency in reference to women migrants. For instance, trafficking appears 24 times, sexual and gender-based violence and exploitation appears 10 times, and the implicit conflation of women with children occurs 28 times in the GCM document. Meanwhile, there are stark differences in the extent to which empowerment (appearing four times) and credential recognition (appearing five times, but never in reference to women migrants) for women migrants are addressed. Major gaps also remain with respect to sexual and reproductive health services, and the experiences and needs of LGBTQI+ migrants, neither
of which appear even once in the GCM’s final draft. These shortcomings undermine the GCM’s professed aims of gender mainstreaming and gender-responsiveness as a guiding principle, and further serve to maintain a disproportionate victimhood discourse surrounding women migrants. They also inadequately engage with the reality of women migrants’ needs on the front lines by failing to address empowerment, skills and health-care issues.

**Bridging the Gaps**

These gaps are why responsible, cross-cutting implementation is so important, and why we have looked to the structure of the UN Migration Network to understand how to engage with the GCM practically. The UN Migration Network will be led by the IOM, with an executive made up of the core group of UN agencies: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, International Labour Organization, IOM, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, UNICEF, UN Development Programme, UN High Commissioner for Refugees and UN Office on Drugs and Crime. Yet UN Women, despite being a member and former chair of the Global Migration Group and having a mandate to support the UN system and member states in gender mainstreaming, is notably absent from the UN Migration Network and the executive committee. Further, there is only one Civil Society Liaison in the UN Migration Network, who cannot feasibly act as both a gender advocate and sole representative of hundreds of civil society organizations working on migration. Finally, the UN Migration Network’s working groups do not directly address gender, and the initial work plan makes no mention of how gender-responsiveness will be realized. There is, in short, a leadership vacuum around gender-responsive migration that urgently needs to be filled.

Given Canada’s substantial role in the negotiation of the GCM’s final 23 objectives that emphasize the importance of gender responsiveness in migration, Canada is well-placed to lead in ensuring the gender-responsive implementation of the GCM at home and abroad.

**Recommendations**

1. **Canada should sponsor and support gender experts at the UN level.**

   - Promote and utilize GBA+ throughout the UN Migration Network
     - Update GBA+ with a module addressing gender and migration specifically, including sexual and reproductive health and LGBTQI+ experiences for migrants, and push it throughout the UN Migration Network. The experiences of migration interact and intersect with gender, and influence how men, women and non-binary individuals navigate their migration pathways as well as their settling in their new host country, and these interlocking identities in the context of migration should be recognized in GBA+.
     - Offer capacity building guided by GBA+, in collaboration with UN Women and the Expert Working Group for Addressing Women’s Human Rights in the GCM, on gender-responsive global implementation of the GCM.
   - Advocate for a gender expert or champion to participate in each thematic working group within the UN Migration Network
     - A fruitful way to do this would be to place one member of the Expert Working Group for Addressing Women’s Human Rights in the GCM within each thematic working group. This would correct for the absence of gender from the UN Migration Network’s work plan and ensure that gender is holistically woven into GCM implementation.
   - Sponsor a secretariat-level gender advocate position in the UN Migration Network in addition to the Civil Society Liaison
     - This will strengthen capacity and help to fill the leadership vacuum that presently exists around gender-responsive migration.
2. On the international level, Canada should use its influence and Feminist International Assistance Policy to support the gender-responsive implementation of the GCM abroad.

- Provide funding and operational advice for the development of gender-responsive national implementation plans in countries receiving official development assistance, migration policies and programs that are consistent with Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy objectives.
- Work with civil society organizations abroad to develop guidelines, administer and monitor programs and policies resulting from the GCM. At the same time, Canada should advocate for meaningful participation of civil society organizations focused on gender and women’s human rights in future events and negotiations.
  - Civil society organizations are most often those on the front lines working directly with migrants in communities, and are thus very well positioned to guide evidence-based and gender-responsive policy development. Engaging closely with civil society throughout the implementation phase of the GCM is also a possible avenue for Canada’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security. Building on previously formed relationships with civil society organizations and the advisory group established by the National Action Plan on women, Peace and Security (Government of Canada, 2018b), GAC and IRCC can continue to build operational capacity in Canada’s migration system, and scale up the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security to build relationships and share knowledge internationally.

3. Canada must develop and implement a national action plan for domestic implementation of the GCM to cultivate best practices to export abroad internationally, thereby strengthening Canada’s reputation as a trailblazer in gender equality and migration governance.

- Canada can “walk the talk” by employing the GBA+ tool domestically at an operational level to Canada’s immigration system and to the resulting policies, programs and initiatives (Hennebry 2019).
  - Expanding the GBA+ to account for factors such as race, ethnicity, religion, age and mental or physical disability, as well as embracing a conception of gender that includes LGBTQI+ gender identities will signal Canada’s commitment to multiculturalism and inclusion at home, while setting normative standards for domestic implementation of the GCM as part and parcel of best practices to share with like-minded countries.
  - Collaboration between IRCC GAC will enhance the development of informed best practices that Canada can implement at home and export abroad.
  - Collaboration between these two government bodies could involve high-level working meetings, training sessions, knowledge sharing, and capacity building and support in terms of bringing the gender-sensitive goals of the Global Compact home to Canada and supporting informed, responsive implementation globally.
  - Canada should align the Temporary Foreign Workers Program with the GCM’s gender-responsive objectives, especially as it pertains to Objective 5 (enhancing availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration); Objective 6 (facilitating fair and ethical recruitment and safeguarding conditions that ensure decent work); Objective 7 (addressing and reducing vulnerabilities in migration); and Objective 10 (preventing, combatting and eradicating trafficking in persons in the context of international migration), to name only a few (UN. 2018a).
About the Authors

Zoe Fortier is a student in the University of Waterloo’s Master of Arts in Global Governance based at the BSIA.

Annalisa Lochan is a student in Wilfrid Laurier University’s Master of International Public Policy Program based at the BSIA.

Nawroos Shibli is a student in the joint-Wilfrid Laurier University/University of Waterloo PhD Global Governance program based at the BSIA.

Horacio Venegas is a student in Wilfrid Laurier University’s Master of International Public Policy Program based at the BSIA.

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Trade and the Environment
Canadian Trade Diversification

Jacob Dinn, Doreen Hüls, Logan Miller and Sophie Wang

Issue

Canada is aiming to diversify its trade and investment partnerships beyond North America and Europe in a manner that supports the rules-based international order. New engagement strategies are needed given the political and economic barriers to trade diversification.

Background

Need for Trade Diversification

Canadian trade is currently heavily biased towards a select few countries (see Appendix, Figure 1). Canada’s most prominent trade partner is the United States. In 2018, 75 percent of Canadian exports were to the United States (Global Affairs Canada [GAC] 2019c). Canada’s heavy reliance on the US market is in line with the predictions of the gravity model of trade (see Appendix 1); however, the dependence on the US market can subject the Canadian economy to volatility. The recent economic and political changes in the United States have created uncertainty for Canadian exporters, highlighting the need for trade diversification to alleviate dependency on the United States. Steps have already been taken towards trade diversification, such as the appointment of a Minister of International Trade Diversification and the signing of trade agreements such as the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement. However, alternative trading relationships and engagement strategies need to be explored further. GAC has tasked us with identifying a region in which Canada can benefit from increased trade.

Why ASEAN?

An examination of Canada’s trade bias towards the country’s top 55 trade partners reveals regions through which Canada can obtain small gains from trade diversification in relative terms, but significant in absolute terms (see Appendix, Figure 1). One prominent region of under-focus is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region, consisting of 650 million people, with a rapidly growing economy of US$2.9 trillion in GDP (Statista 2019a; 2019b). The ASEAN market includes 10 countries: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam – all of which differ in their economic development, level of regulation, and political and business environment.

Benefits

Political Benefits

There are three political benefits for diversifying Canadian trade with ASEAN. First, Canada will better establish itself in the Asia-Pacific region, which is growing in political and economic importance (Baldwin 2013). Currently, Canada is not present in the East Asia Summit, a forum through which Canada could establish a stronger influence and presence in the region. Second, there are political benefits beyond trade diversification, such as security externalities, that are becoming more important given the rise of China. For Canada to be an effective partner in the Asia-Pacific, the Canadian government must commit to growth, peace and stability in the region (Dewitt et al. 2018). Third, Canada has had long-standing...
diplomatic relationships with a number of ASEAN countries, many of which were formed after the countries’ colonial independence. Canada enjoys a stronger people-to-people relationship with Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam due to immigration, and Brunei and Singapore due to trade and investment in the past two decades (Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada 2017).

Over the past 40 years, Canada has been gradually developing closer political and trade relationships with ASEAN. Canada has been one of 10 ASEAN dialogue partners since 1977; in 2011, Canada and ASEAN adopted a Joint Declaration on Trade and Investment; and Canada currently has diplomatic relationships in all 10 ASEAN states (GAC 2019b).

Canada could benefit from further developing its relationships in the region. As the fast-growing and dynamic region gains economic prominence in the near future, Canada needs to close the gap with other countries such as Australia, China, New Zealand and the United States in re-establishing its profile in the ASEAN region. “Liberalized trade and investment would help Canada build its credibility in the region and expand its involvement in other Asia-Pacific initiatives” (Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada 2017, 10).

**Economic Benefits**

The economic benefits of increased trade and investment with the countries of ASEAN are plentiful. A rising middle class and non-matured markets in ASEAN show promise for Canadian businesses (ibid. 2017). The Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada estimates that a free trade agreement between Canada and ASEAN could increase bilateral trade by up to CDN$10.9-billion and generate economic welfare gains of about CDN$1.1 billion for Canada. These gains are expected to benefit both Canadian companies and employees, stimulating economic growth and job creation (ibid. 2017).

Specific sectors in Canada stand to gain from opening trade with the region. ASEAN’s large, growing population is creating increased demand for imports. The Canadian sectors that could best leverage this growth include aerospace, agricultural products, automotive, clean tech, and oil and gas (Baldwin 2013). In addition, the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (2017) also contends that the infrastructure and service sectors offer great potential for Canadian businesses.

**Challenges**

**Economic**

The first challenge for diversifying trade with ASEAN is economic in nature and lies in the diversity of ASEAN member states particularly with respect to their level of socio-economic development (Baldwin 2013). Consequently, Canadian companies can be confronted with different economic conditions when involved with multiple ASEAN member states (ibid.). ASEAN members differ in their infrastructural advancement and in their labour endowments (ibid.). With respect to the latter, the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (2017, 31) states that Canadian businesses face difficulties at times in their ASEAN operations to find “reliable and cost-effective skilled labour.” In addition, local companies oftentimes benefit from preferential treatment (ibid.), which may make it more difficult for Canadian companies to compete in ASEAN markets. Small and medium-sized enterprises are particularly prone to facing this issue (ibid.).

**Business Environment**

The second challenge is that the diversity of ASEAN member states affects Canadian companies’ operations on site. According to the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (2017), companies face different levels of regulations and a diversity of business cultures. Therefore, it is essential for Canadian companies expanding into ASEAN to familiarize and adapt to the country-specific business culture and market behaviour. Moreover, member states vary quite significantly in their ranking with respect to ease of doing business. A visualization by the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada shows that according to the 2016 Ease of Doing Business Rankings — regularly published by the World Bank (Baldwin 2013) — Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand score relatively low (high ease of doing business), while Cambodia, Lao PDR and particularly Myanmar are ranked quite high (low ease of doing business). Next to “infrastructure deficiencies” and “inept bureaucracy,” corruption is considered a major impediment for doing business (ibid, 9).

**Development**

The third challenge is that policies in multiple ASEAN countries are inconsistent with the Canadian government’s Progressive Trade Agenda. The Canadian government has committed to pursuing “progressive approaches with
trading partners in important areas such as transparency, labour rights, the environment, small and medium-sized enterprises, gender, and Indigenous peoples” (GAC 2019d, para. 9). Labour standards in multiple ASEAN countries do not align with the values that Canada wishes to pursue in trade diversification. Furthermore, ASEAN has not negotiated environmental, gender or transparency-related measures in its previous free trade agreements (GAC 2019a). Based on progressive values not being included in ASEAN’s previous trade agreements, it is unlikely that these values would be included in a free trade agreement with Canada.

These examples allude to three problems with signing a free trade agreement with the entire ASEAN region. First, Canada would be pursuing trade diversification with a region that includes small economies that commit human rights abuses with marginal economic benefits. Pursuing a free trade agreement that includes Myanmar, for example, is a departure from Canada’s role as an international leader in pursuing progressive trade. Second, given the different levels of development throughout ASEAN countries, there is a risk of settling for a lowest common denominator agreement. Developing countries often face obstacles, such as weak bureaucratic capacity, that preclude them from signing complex trade agreements (Pangestu 2000). Therefore, accommodating small ASEAN countries might prevent Canada from signing an agreement that achieves meaningful benefits for the Canadian economy. Third, there could be domestic political consequences for the Canadian government by signing trade agreements with countries that commit human rights abuses.

There are also limitations to pursuing bilateral trade agreements with individual ASEAN countries, such as the significant time and resource investment necessary to develop and finalize an agreement. Taken together, these examples show that pursuing a free trade agreement with the entire ASEAN region, or bilateral agreements with individual ASEAN countries, are inadequate strategies for trade diversification.

Political

The fourth challenge is political — particularly Canada’s absence in the Asia-Pacific region. Canada is not well-established in the Asia-Pacific region and is not included in regional fora such as the East Asia Summit (Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada 2017). Furthermore, as noted, Canada does not have a trade agreement with ASEAN, while other similar economies such as Australia and New Zealand signed a free trade agreement with ASEAN in 2010.

ASEAN is a politically difficult region for Canada to access, primarily because of differences in social policies such as the attention to human rights. The European Union experienced difficulties when attempting to negotiate a free trade agreement with ASEAN because certain ASEAN countries were deterred by the European Union’s high trade standards (Valero 2018). Therefore, engaging with ASEAN requires the Canadian government to maintain Canada’s progressive trade agenda. Given Canada’s absence in the region, promoting the benefits of Canada-ASEAN trade to all stakeholders is a challenge. The Canadian government should develop methods for promoting increased trade with ASEAN along with establishing a stronger presence in the region.

Overall, the challenges Canada faces in trade diversification with ASEAN makes the pursuit of a region-wide trade agreement an ineffective engagement strategy. In light of the four challenges discussed above, there are three key policy recommendations Canada should pursue to diversify trade in the ASEAN region.

Recommendations

1. **Extend the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) to include Thailand and Indonesia.** Thailand and Indonesia are the next logical extensions to the CPTPP, as the two countries have relatively high Ease of Doing Business indices and high GDPs per capita, signifying the ability to bring about the greatest marginal gains. A CPTPP extension provides the most political and economic flexibility for Canada in maintaining a high-quality agreement with expected minimal domestic opposition. Other ASEAN countries may be added at a later date when and if they become able to fulfill the CPTPP standards and other CPTPP members agree to the addition.

   Tariffs on imports for some countries in ASEAN are currently very high. The CPTPP gives Canada a tariff-reducing trade agreement with Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam, but does not cover Indonesia or Thailand, which still have high tariffs for Canadian exports. For example, the tariffs faced by Canadian goods being exported to Thailand can be as high
as 50 percent for processed food or 80 percent for automobiles (International Trade Administration 2018). Countries competing with Canada such as Australia, Japan, Korea and New Zealand already have agreements that reduce these tariffs. Thus, Canadian businesses are currently disadvantaged when exporting to ASEAN countries not included in the CPTPP. Extending the CPTPP would reduce tariffs in these countries, leading to large monetary gains from trade.

2. **Enhance business relationships with ASEAN.** As a fundamental step to diversifying trade, Canada needs to gain a more prominent presence in the region. In this regard, emphasizing the development of long-term business relationships with local partners is critical (Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada 2017). While the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada notes that extensive research is involved in building relationships with local partners, it also states, based on its referenced case studies, that thorough research is important for reputational reasons. Moreover, the diverse nature of ASEAN member states would require a differentiated approach, in which its members must receive individual consideration (ibid.). Building business relationships could, for example, take the form of hosting joint Canada-ASEAN business consultations to discuss trade and investment challenges, proposed solutions and a devised path forward. This would be relatively low in cost yet valuable to arrange.

3. **Better inclusion of “after-care provisions” in trade negotiations.** Post-trade negotiations, Canada should develop more effective after-care provisions to ensure that Canadian businesses are provided access to protection mechanisms in foreign markets. For example, Canadian firms can have improved access to Canada’s Trade Commissioner to discuss best practices for overcoming barriers and entering a particular market. After-care will allow more Canadian firms to access foreign markets with a greater understanding of the respective culture and business environment.

### About the Authors

**Jacob Dinn** is a student in the University of Waterloo’s Master of Arts in Global Governance program based at the BSIA.

**Doreen Hüls** was an exchange student in the University of Waterloo’s Master of Arts in Global Governance program (Fall 2018, Winter 2019) based at the BSIA. At her home university in Germany, the University of Konstanz, she is enrolled in the Master of Science Political Economy program.

**Logan Miller** is a student in the University of Waterloo’s Master of Arts in Global Governance program based at the BSIA.

**Sophie Wang** is a student in the University of Waterloo’s Master of Arts in Global Governance program based at the BSIA.

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Appendix 1

The gravity model of trade is a regression model estimating the amount of trade between two countries; it is based on the relative size of two economies and the proximity between them:

\[ \text{Trade Flow}_{ij} = C \frac{GDP_i + GDP_j}{\text{Distance}_{ij}} \]

Appendix 2

Figure 1: Trade Bias Towards Canada’s Top 55 Trading Partners

Source: Authors.
Works Cited


Decarbonizing Global Electricity Generation: Canada’s Role

Kevin Brink, Jonathan Hui and Stefano Lopreiato

Issue

The electricity generation sector comprises a large share of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions; therefore, strategic and creative decarbonization policy solutions are required in this crucial sector worldwide in order to effectively combat climate change.

Background

Electricity Trade as a Tool for Emissions Reduction

Electricity trade has potential to reduce GHG emissions within a region. To illustrate, given two jurisdictions with differing generation mixes (i.e., one emits more through generation) and commitments to reducing GHG emissions, trade can reduce GHG emissions if the jurisdiction with the dirtier generation mix purchases electricity from the other jurisdiction instead of constructing new generation sources at home. Regional emissions can be further reduced by targeting clean generation investments to the jurisdiction with the cleaner generation mix and likely comparative advantage.

Electricity Trade in the World Today

There is a high volume of electricity trade worldwide in both developed and emerging economies. The volume of this trade is facilitated and organized by numerous power pools worldwide. These are formal regional entities with the purpose of coordinating electricity generation, transmission and trade among jurisdictions in a region. These power pools and their constituent jurisdictions generally seek to increase trade for many purposes including increasing resilience to electricity supply shocks and reducing electricity pricing. However, generation emissions reduction is not often an explicit goal — it is typically only a by-product of increasing trade. An example of this is the trade between Ontario and the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) interconnection in the Eastern United States. Ontario, with an almost entirely clean generation mix, sells a large volume of electricity to distribution companies in the PJM interconnection, a jurisdiction with a considerably dirtier generation mix. This is primarily due to the lower costs of Ontario power and not to the cleaner nature of its sources.

Global Drivers for Increased Clean Electricity Trade

Sustainable Development Goals

There is considerable overlap between the benefits associated with the expansion of electricity trade and the targets outlined in the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, especially those related to Goals 7 and 8. Goal 7 strives for increased energy access, improved international cooperation on clean technology and improving energy efficiency, all of which are closely related to increasing electricity trade. Increasing electricity trade is conducive to the targets of Goal 8 in technology innovation and diversification.

Climate Change: Climate Adaption

The planet continues to experience rising temperatures, rising sea levels and more extreme weather patterns
due to growing concentrations of GHGs. Sustainable development can reduce vulnerability to climate change by enhancing adaptive capacity and increasing resilience within communities (UN Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC] 2018). With increased trade of electricity, vulnerabilities to associated adverse effects will be reduced through the more distributed power grid.

**Decarbonization as a Driver for Increased Electricity Trade**

Growing consensus within the global community on combatting climate change is best represented by agreements such as the 2015 Paris Agreement. The participation of global actors in these agreements increasingly urges the global community to decarbonize and increase electrification in order to meet environmental standards. Mitigation pathways to these ends require increased decarbonization of electricity and increased electrification of energy use.

**Barriers to Decarbonization Using Electricity Trade**

Since electricity trade as an explicit policy tool for reducing GHG emissions is an underutilized option, existing barriers to its use for this purpose are difficult to identify specifically. The primary barriers to the concept are simply barriers to increasing electricity trade at all.

**The Self-sufficiency Mandate**

Historically, jurisdictions organized their electricity systems so that they have the capacity to operate without support from other jurisdictions. This was an important factor in generation investment decisions in the past when transmission systems were weaker and more unreliable, but today, with the extensive enmeshment of economies and the very low risk of neighbour dependence, especially within developed economies, this concept has become outdated, inefficient and detrimentally persistent.

**Rising Barriers to Trade**

The current global trend, temporary or otherwise, is a growing attitude of nationalism and increasing barriers to trade, especially within the United States. The nationalist attitude of nationally generated electricity with no attention to its efficiency or cleanliness is a clear barrier to decarbonization using electricity trade.

**Slow Climate Action Goal Progress**

Although nearly all countries have submitted intended nationally-determined contributions (INDCs) as a requirement in the Paris Agreement, there is little progress towards fulfilling these INDCs collectively. For example, coal-dependent generation policies are still being implemented by countries that have made significant commitments to reducing emissions. Using electricity trade as a tool to reduce emissions is only possible when jurisdictions want to reduce emissions.

**Popularity of the Micro-grid Concept**

In some markets, such as in Sub-Saharan Africa, large centralized generation systems may be less efficient than local generation due primarily to the high transmission cost to customer revenue ratio and the dramatically falling price of photovoltaic solar generation technology. Although there are substantial efficiency gains by micro-grids in some regions, in the cases where centralized generation involving electricity trade is more efficient and emissions-reducing, the popularity of the micro-grid concept may push back against the more effective centralized generation system.

**Insufficient Investments**

Investments in transmission infrastructure, somewhat obviously, is crucial to the expansion of electricity trade. In emerging markets especially, there is a perceived high risk to transmission projects and so attracting investment can be difficult.

**The Role of Canada in Global Decarbonization Using Electricity Trade**

Domestically, Canada is home to a world-leading generation mix with 82 percent of electricity generated through clean sources (National Resources Canada 2019a). This clean electricity advantage is central to fulfilling Canada’s climate pledges and to the Pan-Canadian Framework on Climate Change, which holds green technology, innovation and jobs as one of its key pillars. In order to achieve the transition to clean energy, the generation sector is projected to triple in generating capacity by 2050 and require unparalleled cooperation between the public, private, indigenous and civil society sectors (Canadian Electricity Association 2017).

Abroad, Canada has been active in energy governance as a member country of both the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the International Renewable Energy Agency.
Decarbonizing Global Electricity Generation: Canada’s Role

(IRÉNA), as well as the Mission Innovation initiative announced at the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris dedicated to accelerating global clean energy innovation (National Resources Canada 2019b). Specific to electricity, Canada and the United States co-manage the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), a standard-setting body dedicated to continental grid resilience that also partners with the European Union around grid collaboration and innovation (NERC 2019). As part of its 2018 Group of Seven Presidency, Canada made climate change and clean energy a core issue of discussion, emphasizing the transition to clean energy sources as an international challenge.

How Decarbonization Using Electricity Trade is in Canada’s Interest

Electricity trade and clean technology benefit Canadian interests in multiple ways. Internationally, action on expanding renewable sources and electricity transmission are key parts of climate action, as supported by the UNFCCC, IEA and IRENA. Economically, Canada is the fifth-largest net energy exporter, with energy making up 11 percent of nominal GDP (National Resources Canada 2018). Leading this energy transition is an imperative for ensuring future economic prosperity and maintaining competitiveness in a fast-changing energy landscape. The development of Canadian clean energy technology also enables economic and trade diversification, promoting the export of clean technologies to countries intent on greening their generation mixes. Natural Resources Canada has noted energy efficiency and distributed power generation as two natural opportunity areas for the government to lead in promoting and fostering greater global energy innovation (Natural Resources Canada and McKinsey & Co.2012).

Recommendations

1. **Canada should promote the use of electricity trade as an explicit tool for reducing GHG emissions within regional power pools worldwide.** Through its membership in the UNFCCC, IEA and IRENA, Canada should promote the importance of electricity trade as a useful tool for regional reductions in GHG emissions. At future Conferences of the Parties, the Canadian delegation should advocate for investments in transmission infrastructure and power pool–coordinated clean generation technologies. Canada should use its diplomatic ties with regional power pools (such as the Southern African Power Pool or the PJM interconnection) to include reducing emissions through trade as an explicit goal within their mandates.

2. **Canada should engage in sustainable finance internationally and support standards for climate-related financial disclosure.** Sustainable finance covers capital flows, risk management, and financial processes that include environmental and social factors as key considerations for capital allocation. The Canadian Expert Panel on Sustainable Finance has called for effective and consistent financial regulation and greater financial cross-sector collaboration (Executive Summary 2018). GAC should facilitate knowledge sharing between Canadian finance authorities and foreign central banking or international institutions, such as the Network for Greening the Financial System or the IEA. The European Union is developing taxonomies and frameworks for sustainable economic activity, market benchmarks and labelling of financial products, and Canada should play an active part in this discussion through forums such as the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (International Institute for Sustainable Development 2019). GAC should facilitate linking trade opportunities, development financing and central banking around creating risk disclosure standards that better inform Canadian companies and align domestic and international finance with the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

3. **Canada should promote investment in micro-grids where they have efficiency gains over distributed power grids.** Micro-grids operate independently from distributed power grids. The implementation of micro-grid technology at a larger scale where appropriate provides increased electricity access while avoiding increased GHG emissions. As a demonstration, Quebec companies have been implementing renewable micro-grid electricity projects in Nunavut to supply electricity to Indigenous communities (Export Development Canada 2017). GAC should invest in micro-grid projects that support technology developers and promote research and development centres. Furthermore, GAC should act as a facilitator in linking potential entrepreneurs who have the capacity to launch or expand micro-grid projects.
About the Authors

Kevin Brink is a student in Wilfrid Laurier University’s Master of International Public Policy program based at the BSIA.

Jonathan Hui is a student in the joint-Wilfrid Laurier University/University of Waterloo PhD Global Governance program based at the BSIA.

Stefano Lopreiato is a student in Wilfrid Laurier University’s Master of International Public Policy program based at the BSIA.

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Two Birds, One Stone: Policy Coherence for Feminist Climate Compatible Development

Kayleigh Swanson and Clare Urquhart

Issue

Canada seeks to leverage the rules-based international order to address climate change as well as reduce poverty and advance gender equality; however, more coherent strategies are needed to simultaneously achieve Canada’s international development and climate policy goals.

Background

Interlinkages of Climate Impacts, Poverty and Gender

Climate change impacts are projected to erode food security and reduce access to the natural resources on which poor people depend for livelihoods (Nunan 2017). These outcomes will slow down economic growth and make poverty reduction more difficult. In many developing country contexts, women and girls are predominately responsible for food production and household water and energy supply. These socially prescribed gender roles mean women and girls are disproportionately affected by climate change that makes these tasks more difficult and time consuming. Women’s dependence on natural resources and unequal access to productive assets are challenges that are compounded by limited mobility and decision-making power (UN Women 2016).

Climate compatible development (CCD) adopts mitigation and adaptation strategies that simultaneously reduce greenhouse gas emissions, build resilience and promote development (Climate & Development Knowledge Network 2010). CCD solutions are designed to safeguard development from climate impacts by supporting low carbon and climate resilient development. For example, programs that enable women to seek entrepreneurship opportunities in the renewable energy sector simultaneously reduce greenhouse gas emissions, help communities adapt to a changing climate, and promote development by providing necessary infrastructure while improving the capacity of women to respond to the impacts of climate change.

CCD solutions are especially relevant to addressing the environmental impacts of agricultural practices, deforestation and the use of non-renewable energy sources. Additionally, there is a direct connection between CCD strategies and poverty reduction. When employed in the agricultural sector, CCD solutions can work toward eradicating hunger. When employed in the clean energy sector, CCD solutions can provide economic opportunities that support skilled training and contribute to reducing poverty. As climate change aggravates poverty — especially for women who depend on natural resources as livelihoods — CCD strategies have become increasingly necessary to achieve international development goals.

Guidance From the International Order for Addressing Climate and Gender Equality

Global Affairs Canada (GAC) has expressed its commitment to protecting and reforming the rules-based international order (RBIO) as one of four priorities in 2019–2020. In addition to providing economic benefits,
defending the RBIO enables Canada to advance its interests related to poverty reduction, gender equality and climate change in international forums. Two key United Nations international agreements designed to strengthen national climate policies and commitments to sustainable development are the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, centered on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Both agreements recognize that climate change and gender equality must be addressed simultaneously. For example, parties to the UNFCCC have recognized the importance of involving women in the development and implementation of gender-responsive national climate policies by including overarching text in the Paris Agreement. The agreement states that parties should promote gender equality and the empowerment of women when acting to address climate change (UNFCCC 2015). Moreover, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development regards the SDGs as integrated and indivisible. Scientific research has shown that climate action (SDG 13) and gender equality (SDG 5) are inextricably linked, namely through population pressure (Schweizer 2019). SDG 17 on partnerships for the goals points to the importance of global cooperation for achieving a universal rules-based system.

**Canada’s Framework for Assessing Gender Equality Results**

Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP) supports the idea that CCD solutions can be delivered in a manner that empowers women and girls. Prioritizing Canada’s FIAP has served to effectively target gender equality goals in GAC projects, but the extent to which the FIAP has contributed to additional goals, such as reducing poverty and addressing climate change, is less clear. To target and mainstream gender equality practices and outcomes in line with the FIAP, GAC relies on a framework for assessing gender equality results. However, the tool does not assess CCD results or poverty reduction outcomes. Greater integration and stronger policy coherence are needed to ensure that Canada’s interventions have the greatest possible impact on the overlapping dimensions of development described above.

**Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development**

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has recognized the value of policy coherence that fosters synergies across economic, social and environmental policy areas (OECD 2017). The UNFCCC also affirms that responses to climate change should be coordinated with social and economic development in an integrated manner (UNFCCC 1992). A policy coherence approach to international development suggests that GAC’s project portfolio should not be thematic blind. Being more deliberate about project selection can enhance policy coherence to help deliver integrated policies that ensure progress achieved on one goal, such as gender equality (SDG 5), contributes to progress on other goals, such as climate action (SDG 13) and poverty reduction (SDG 1). CCD lends itself naturally to policy coherence because CCD solutions pursue development goals such as poverty reduction and accessible and clean energy (SDG 7) in concert with SDG 13. Because GAC has multiple goals in the areas of development policy and climate action, the interlinkages between climate impacts, poverty and gender (such as those described above) indicate that GAC will experience sub-optimal results if its project portfolio remains sector and thematic blind.

An example of strong policy coherence, which GAC should replicate in other projects, is its project with the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to safeguard forests in Honduras under the leadership of women and Indigenous youth. This project is exemplary because it simultaneously empowers women in line with Canada’s FIAP, promotes conservation, reduces greenhouse gas emissions by enhancing forests as natural carbon sinks, and facilitates poverty reduction through economic growth (FAO 2018). GAC can strengthen the impact of its project portfolio by better leveraging the co-benefits between gender equality and climate action to target those projects most capable of simultaneously empowering women and girls, addressing climate change and reducing poverty.

GAC pursues multiple projects that address gender equality and climate impacts, but the crossover between these target areas among current projects could be strengthened. GAC’s online Project Browser categorizes
projects based on the degree to which they support key sectors related to environmental sustainability and gender equality (Government of Canada 2019). However, few of these projects intentionally target both gender and the environment, despite interlinkages between these sectors. For example, of the 35 projects categorized under the women’s rights and equality sector, only one also lists environmental protection as a sector of focus. Of the 16 projects categorized under the biosphere protection sector, none list women’s rights and equality as a sector of focus. Although many of these projects list gender equality as a significant objective, the interlinkages between gender and climate described above indicate that greater integration of these sectors of focus among current projects would strengthen GAC’s project portfolio.

Organizing GAC projects into sector silos undermines policy coherence by labelling projects that address overlapping dimensions of sustainable development as strictly sector-specific. Recognizing opportunities for stronger coordination of projects across overlapping sectors would enable GAC to more easily assess the strength of its project portfolio in terms of its impact on overlapping dimensions of development, and provide developing nations with examples of effective CCD to encourage the adoption of similar policies. The FIAP supports both development and foreign policy objectives by promoting feminist values, and as such, the FIAP represents an opportunity for greater integration of Canada’s foreign policy and development goals. In addition to moving the ball forward on multiple SDGs, integrating Canada’s foreign policy and development objectives serves the ancillary purpose of supporting greater coherence among departments at GAC.

Communicating Canada’s Commitment to Gender Equality

The Trudeau government has clearly expressed its commitment to advancing gender equality by prioritizing the FIAP. However, the extent to which the FIAP has addressed climate change as well as reduced poverty is less clear to external observers. Raising the profile of the FIAP in key international forums would raise external awareness of the policy, enhance Canada’s soft-power influence and potentially contribute to achieving GAC’s vision of implementing the FIAP on an international level. Leveraging opportunities for communication during international conferences, for instance, serves as a means by which Canada can exercise leadership on gender equality and policy coherence in a highly visible way. The UNFCCC Conference of Parties (COP) 25 is an example of an international forum where GAC should promote the FIAP through awareness-raising opportunities such as the pre-COP 25 pavilion or COP 25 side events.

COP 25 Platform

The COP is a high-profile event attended by civil society organizations and media reporters. It invites countries that have ratified the UNFCCC to come together to discuss the ways in which the challenges posed by climate change can be proactively addressed. As a signatory to the UNFCCC, Canada can use this platform to communicate the ways in which CCD strategies and the FIAP can simultaneously address climate, international development and gender equality challenges.

Pre-COP 25 and COP 25 Side Events

Prior to COP 25, Canada can showcase its efforts to incorporate the FIAP and CCD strategies into its project portfolio during a pre-conference pavilion. In addition to leveraging its platform during COP 25, Canada can host a COP 25 side event to showcase projects that demonstrate the effectiveness of the FIAP and CCD strategies for achieving the SDGs.

Recommendations

Canada has an opportunity to support developing nations in building resilience and reducing the impacts of climate change on poverty by designing development policies that are gender-responsive and climate-informed. GAC should:


2. Pursue policy coherence to better leverage the co-benefits of gender equality and climate compatible development.

3. Design an assessment tool such as the existing framework for assessing gender equality results to monitor results for climate compatible development, enabling GAC to target those projects most capable of simultaneously addressing climate change, empowering women and girls, and reducing poverty.

Kayleigh Swanson and Clare Urquhart
4. **Raise the profile of Canada’s FIAP in key international forums — namely, at the UNFCCC COP 25, and through awareness-raisin opportunities such as the pre-COP 25 pavilion or COP 25 side events.**

**About the Authors**

Kayleigh Swanson is a student in the University of Waterloo’s Master of Arts in Global Governance program based at the BSIA.

Clare Urquhart is a student in the University of Waterloo’s Master of Arts in Global Governance program based at the BSIA.

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Security in a Turbulent World
The Future of Peacekeeping

Jalil Benish, Katelyn Forsyth, Abdi Issa and Samuel Vargas

Issue

This policy brief explores Canada’s involvement in United Nations peacekeeping. As Canada continues to campaign for a seat on the United Nations Security Council, we outline several avenues through which Canada can demonstrate leadership to strengthen peacekeeping and help make it “fit for the future.”

Background

The vitality of the rules-based international order continues to be a pressing and consistent foreign policy concern for Canada, and for good reason. The liberal order that has governed the post-World War II system has been strained by innumerable conflicts, protracted intra-state instability, and declining trust and goodwill among states. This multi-pronged assault on the rules-based international order has forced the United Nations to think pragmatically about the future of peacekeeping, one area that has been affected by the aforementioned developments. UN Secretary-General António Guterres’ Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative, introduced in 2017, outlines three broad areas for reform: development system reform; peace and security architecture reform; and management reform aimed at making peacekeeping “fit for the future” (UN 2017c). Although it is too early to predict what the cumulative outcome of Guterres’ reform agenda will be, it is clear that UN peacekeeping is at a critical juncture.

Given these developments, it is vitally important that supporters of peacekeeping, such as Canada, recognize the challenges that peacekeeping faces and step up to defend, re-shape and strengthen the capacity of UN peace operations. As such, this policy brief explores what these developments mean for Canada’s foreign policy objectives and, more importantly, how Canada can position itself as a key contributor to the peacekeeping reform agenda. This policy brief begins with a brief contextual overview of Canada’s historical engagement with peacekeeping, followed by an examination of recent changes to peacekeeping — both domestically and internationally — and, finally, a review of Canada’s key peacekeeping support initiatives. This policy brief concludes with four policy recommendations, grouped around three thematic areas: training, protection of civilians (POC) and gender. Instead of advocating for additional “boots on the ground,” we suggest that Canada should consider a number of discrete, impactful initiatives that will provide added value to existing UN peacekeeping operations.

Strategic involvement in UN peacekeeping is in Canada’s long-term national interest, and Canada’s current campaign for a seat on the UN Security Council provides a unique opportunity to defend a key pillar of the multilateral security order. Contemporary conflict threatens international stability, and today’s crises — whether the migrant crisis gripping the Mediterranean and Middle East, or the protracted conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa — all require multilateral solutions.

Peacekeeping is a hallmark institution of the multilateral, rules-based international order, and has ensured a degree of peace and security in the past and is needed now and in the future. Peacekeeping has been shown to significantly reduce the likelihood of renewed conflict (Fortna 2008) and, when properly equipped and mandated, peacekeeping missions can help to avert humanitarian disasters and prevent violence against civilians (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2013; Hultman 2010). As peacekeeping
represents a more cost-effective means of mitigating international conflicts than bilateral intervention (Goldstein 2011), it is therefore in Canada's national interest to ensure that these missions are sufficiently capacitated to address contemporary conflicts.

**Making Peacekeeping “Fit for the Future”**

Today, the future of UN peacekeeping is threatened by budgetary shortfalls as well as declining political will from troop-contributing countries and Security Council members. Despite a recent surge in conflict around the globe, the United Nation’s capacity to respond to and manage conflict is undergoing a period of contraction. Current peacekeeping missions are highly complex, involving a broad range of actors and objectives in unstable contexts where there is often no peace to keep. Successful peace operations require the incorporation of political, diplomatic and developmental components that bridge the gap between conflict prevention, mediation and long-term peacebuilding. Secretary-General Guterres’ A4P agenda has focused on developing institutional reforms to bolster the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. By reducing fragmentation across the UN system, Guterres hoped to promote “a more joined up, whole-of-pillar approach to the delivery of mandates and stronger cross-pillar cooperation” (UN 2017b). These institutional reforms are vital to ensuring that peacekeeping operations are focused, supported by clear decision-making structures and that they possess the budgetary and field support required to be successful.

**Canada and Peacekeeping**

Peacekeeping has historically been one of the defining features of Canada’s national identity. In fact, when then-Prime Minister Jean Chrétien proclaimed that “We are always there, like the Boy Scouts,” (cited in Carroll 2016, 167) he was tapping into a long-held belief by Canadians that we are a peacekeeping nation. Although innumerable works have questioned the truth behind this claim (see Carroll 2016; Martin-Brule and von Hlatky 2017), there is certainly no denying that Canada has made important contributions to peacekeeping. In recent years, Canada’s contributions to peacekeeping have shifted, and are increasingly shaped by an interest in providing high-end capabilities and specialized training (Prime Minister’s Office 2017). Canada has also championed peacekeeping in high-level fora and hosted the 2017 UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial Conference in Vancouver, BC, promoting the “Smart Pledge” approach aimed at providing the UN “with the predictability it needs to more effectively plan its operations and training” (ibid.). Canada’s commitment to smart pledging “encourages better coordination of contributions to peacekeeping missions from partner countries, helping to eliminate critical gaps and ensuring that contributions can be deployed on a rotating basis” (ibid.). Finally, Canada supported the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali with specialized contingents of Canadian Armed Forces, offering vital mission air support (Government of Canada 2019).

As a country that is dependent on a stable, rules-based international order for its economic well-being, Canada should support UN peacekeeping by continuing to champion current reform efforts and by making strategic contributions in key areas where Canada has both expertise and long-standing interest. Canada’s past and ongoing involvement in the areas of peacekeeper training, protection of civilians and the gendered dimensions of conflict and development provides a natural base from which to develop new initiatives, approaches and strategies that add value to peacekeeping operations. These three themes have been critical to Canada’s foreign policy approach and initiatives. Canada has a strong tradition of peacekeeper training, grounded both in Canada’s professional and highly regarded military and in its experience with the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre. Canada has also been a long-standing champion of human rights and humanitarianism, embodied both in Canadian leadership in the development of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine and its early leadership in introducing POC mandates into UN peace operations. Finally, gender has been a centrepiece of Canada’s feminist foreign and international assistance policy, and the current government remains strongly committed to the promotion of gender equality on a global level. These three themes demonstrate areas where Canada has shown consistent leadership and committed support, representing natural areas for further Canadian action.

**What Canada is Doing on Training, POC and Gender**

**Training** is vital to the success of peacekeeping missions. In fact, Secretary-General Guterres’ A4P reform agenda emphasizes the need for member states to assist in capacity building for mission contingents, particularly the need to implement a light coordination mechanism and language
training, as well as cultural competence around local customs and traditions (UN n.d.). Canada continues to invest in modernizing and enhancing peace operations by training peacekeepers in contexts where training is needed, and in thematic areas in which Canada has established expertise. In the past, Canada has met the call for action in supporting peacekeeping training, routinely leveraging the expertise of its military to support peacekeepers.

Today, peacekeeping missions are often faced with a lack of capacity to engage in conflict management, in part because they lack comprehensive training on how to engage local communities, address child soldiers, identify gender-based violence or ensure the protection of civilians. Additionally, another critical problem is an ongoing deficit of specialized French-language peacekeeper training, which is particularly problematic given that many ongoing peace operations are situated in francophone countries.

Canada can provide modules for peacekeeping training in both English and French, ensuring that all peacekeepers are able to address and effectively engage with policing, gender, child soldiers and the POC mandates. Due to the dynamic of peacekeeping missions today, peacekeepers are engaging with unconventional threats and conflict situations; one urgent example of this is the issue of child soldiers (UN 2017a). Peacekeepers often do not have the capacity to engage with child soldiers effectively and, as such, peacekeeping training ought to be focused on building that capacity. Canada has the knowledge and capacity to assist in the development of specialized training modules, specifically around engaging with child soldiers — building on expertise developed through The Roméo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative — and the POC agenda.

On the POC agenda, Canada has championed this mandate as imperative to the success of peacekeeping. During the establishment of the UN mission in Sierra Leone in 1999, Canada was a strong supporter of the first mandate to explicitly authorize UN forces to protect civilians under threat of imminent violence. POC mandates have appeared in nearly all UN peacekeeping missions since 1999 (Sebastian 2015). As Canada campaigns for a seat on the Security Council, it is imperative that Canada continues to speak up loudly about the importance of protecting civilians in conflict zones, and it should continue to push for adequate funding to support the effective operationalization of POC mandates. The POC agenda gives Canada an opportunity to clearly articulate what its priorities are on the international security agenda. Similarly, Canada has been a consistent contributor of police to peacekeeping operations. In fact, Canada has provided more than 4,000 police officers to various peacekeeping missions through the Canadian Police Arrangement, an initiative under Canada’s International Police Peacekeeping and Peace Operations contributions (Government of Canada 2019). Canada’s secondment of police officers provides critical mission support to peacekeeping operations and is essential to ensuring that missions are able to achieve their mandates by providing security to local communities affected by violence. Building on the success of Canada’s policing contributions requires finding ways to galvanize support from member states to continue to engage in policing-centred peacekeeping.

On gender, Canada’s commitment to the Elsie Initiative demonstrates Canada’s ability to offer international leadership on the fair treatment of women in conflict-affected contexts. Consistent with Canada’s commitment to Gender-Based Analysis Plus policy making, Canada has encouraged a whole-of-government approach that looks at empowering women in conflict environments. The Elsie Initiative aims to incentivize member states — through the provision of financial support — to remove barriers of entry to women’s participation in peacekeeping operations. However, as noted in the International Peace Institute’s Not Just a Numbers Game report, many of the world’s leading peacekeeping contributing nations have deeply embedded barriers of entry for women which can make it difficult for member states to integrate more women into peacekeeping missions (Dharmapuri 2013). Tackling these barriers is a long-term project, and it is estimated that it will not be until 2028 that 25 percent of all peacekeepers are women (Sherman 2018). In the meantime, millions of women and girls in conflict zones urgently require assistance, and finding way to reduce their insecurity remains a key challenge for UN peacekeeping.

**Recommendations**

1. **Training**: Canada should position itself as a world-leader in specialized peacekeeper training, and in particular develop training modules on POC, on engaging with child soldiers and on gender-inclusive peacekeeping. Additionally, Canada should leverage the competitive advantage of a bilingual military to consolidate its expertise in the provision of thematic training for francophone peacekeepers. Canada should
capitalizing on this opportunity to systematize its peacekeeping training initiatives by harnessing these niche capacities.

2. **Championing the POC agenda on the international stage:** Given the pressure that peacekeeping is under at the moment to be leaner, and possibly meaner, Canada should take every opportunity to speak out against budget cuts that would negatively impact the ability of missions to protect civilians. This includes speaking loudly and clearly — using the platform provided by Canada’s campaign for a Security Council seat — against cuts to gender advisers, POC advisers, civil affairs officers or community-liaison assistants.

3. **Policing:** Given the importance of policing to both contemporary peacekeeping and POC, Canada should initiate a blue-ribbon panel to examine how to strengthen the role of policing in contemporary peacekeeping. Following the successful model of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, such a high-level policy discussion would focus broad international attention on both the challenges of police peacekeeping and on the development of innovative strategies that place policing at the heart of the POC agenda. Leadership on such an initiative would leverage existing Canadian expertise in this area and promote greater understanding of the added value of police to peacekeeping missions.

4. **Gender — Elsie II:** Canada should build on the progress it made in promoting more uniformed women in peacekeeping operations through the Elsie Initiative by initiating a second Elsie Initiative. Elsie II should focus on promoting gender-inclusive and gender-balanced security provision among the police services of conflict-affected states. Utilizing resources available through Global Affairs Canada’s Peace and Stabilization Operations Program, Elsie II should provide specific support for reform initiatives that both incentivize increased representation of women in police forces in conflict-affected countries and encourage both gender-sensitive and gender-inclusive policing, in part through the provision of specialized training.

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**About the Authors**

**Katelyn Forsyth** is a student in the University of Waterloo’s Master of Arts in Global Governance program based at the BSIA.

**Abdiasis Issa** is a Ph.D. student in the joint-Wilfrid Laurier University/University of Waterloo Global Governance program based at the BSIA.

**Samuel Vargas** is a student in Wilfrid Laurier University’s Master of International Public Policy program based at the Balsillie School of International Affairs.

**Abdul Jalil Benish** is a student in Wilfrid Laurier University’s Master of International Public Policy program based at the BSIA.

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Climate Security in the Asia Pacific

Simon Gonsalves, Graydon Fleming and So Youn (Annie) Kim

Issue
The prosperity and stability of the Asia Pacific is predominantly threatened not by American or Chinese power, but by our era's greatest collective-action challenge: anthropogenic climate change.

Background
The Asia Pacific is projected to be one of the most economically dynamic areas of the globe in the coming decades. Considering recent seismic shifts in its international relations and the wider global order, the Government of Canada (GoC) has made strengthening its economic and political relationships with important regional states one of its highest priorities. However, anthropogenic climate change threatens to destabilize the Asia Pacific. If expansive and robust measures are not taken in response to the rise in global temperature, states located in the Pacific Rim will suffer disproportionately. Regional insecurities will be significantly aggravated by increasingly inhospitable weather patterns. Environmental security should be a core element of Canadian foreign policy. This policy brief outlines the myriad threats that climate change poses to the Asia Pacific, articulates the salience of climate security theory, and discusses the benefits and opportunities for Canadian engagement in Asia-Pacific environmental security.

Canadian Trade Reorientation
Global Affairs Canada (GAC) data estimates that one in every five Canadian jobs is linked to exports (GAC 2013). However, deepening bilateral uncertainty, animosity and distrust between Canada and its top two singular trading partners, the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC), have forced a GoC re-evaluation. The creation of a cabinet-level portfolio on International Trade Diversification demonstrates the gravity of the situation. GAC has stated the need to aggressively secure “more opportunities for Canadian exporters and investors to compete and succeed in fast-growing global markets” (GAC 2019). These states are disproportionately located in the Asia Pacific, a region projected to significantly expand in global economic influence (International Monetary Fund 2018). The Asia Pacific has a “growing role in the global economy and politics… (and is of) critical importance to a broad range of Canadian goals, including prosperity, development, sustainability, peace, and security” (GAC 2018).

Impact of Climate Change on the Asia Pacific
Significant increases in global temperature, caused by anthropogenic forces, will force all countries to adapt and overcome to some degree. However, the issue of rising temperatures and climate disruption will inordinately affect many countries of the Western Pacific (Busby and Krishnan 2017). States within this geographic area have already been disproportionately affected (Eckstein, Hutfils and Winges 2018). The increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather events will dislocate the region’s low-lying infrastructure and population (Francisco 2008). Other linked cascading impacts, such as increased food insecurity and inter/intranational migration, will further destabilize core Asia-Pacific countries. The future is grim if current projected emissions hold — let
alone accelerated worst-case scenarios. While no state will escape the consequences of a warming planet, the international distribution of climate disruption is far from equitable (Francesco and Werrell 2017). Some Asia-Pacific countries, such as the People’s Republic of China, have the technical and financial resources to better adapt, contain, and recover from damages wrought by a changing climate. The Asia Pacific’s poorer, less-developed states lack similar levels of resiliency (Joshua and Krishnan 2017).

**Relationship between Climate Change and International Security**

As Canada seeks greater involvement in the Asia Pacific, uncontrolled climate change will complicate Canadian foreign policy. The level of knowledge concerning Canada’s “indirect exposure to climate change elsewhere is still insignificant and fragmented,” and East Asia remains understudied (Dalby et al. 2017). However, relationships between climate change, international tension and conflict are becoming increasingly clear. Changing climate conditions do not automatically result in heightened levels of conflict, and the non-linear nature of climate change makes accurate long-term predictions challenging. Rather, climate interacts and converges with other existing risks and pressures across the globe. As climate disruption accelerates, future international armed conflicts will likely have salient climatic dimensions. Climate change is Asia Pacific’s greatest threat multiplier and risk accelerator, creating new tensions and worsening existing dangers. Many states in the developing world, already under significant environmental and social stress, are particularly vulnerable to climate-intensified destabilization.

Thomas Homer-Dixon (1994), a distinguished environmental security scholar, identifies three conditions where environmental factors can drive violent conflict and international tension:

1. When there are decreases in the supply of controllable resources.
2. When environmental scarcity causes economic deprivation.
3. When large population movements caused by environmental stress exacerbate group identity conflicts.

The confluence of these factors can instigate and exacerbate regional rivalries. The geopolitical situation in the Pacific Rim is already fraught with risk. Environmental degradation, caused by structural land use changes and poor resource governance, are already increasing tensions in the Asia Pacific. Climate change will make fragile situations worse. Indeed, the situation in the South China Sea demonstrates how changes in environmental patterns, alongside climate change’s role as a conflict amplifier, are further complicating an already fraught state of affairs and having real consequences for international relations. The rate of aquatic species depletion across the Asia Pacific is accelerating, due to excessive overfishing, alongside rising ocean temperature and acidification. Simultaneously, climate change is causing decreasing fish stocks to migrate further northward, as waters warm (Thomas 2017). As commercial fleets trail them into contentiously disputed waters, tensions flare between China and other South China Sea claimant states whose economies depend on their fishing sectors (Francesco and Werrell 2017).

The damages wrought by climate change will increase the probability of regional armed conflict. By intensifying resurgent nationalist sentiments and zero-sum mentalities, a less predictable and more inhospitable climate can prove dangerous alongside heightened concerns about national security. Heightened tensions between states pose challenges to essential mitigation of carbon emissions and climate adaptation policies. Facing rising uncertainty, countries might feel compelled to triage and concentrate national resources to fund security sectors and national defence. Amplified focus on conventional security will possibly prove fatal for the region’s long-term environmental security, making the Asia Pacific less stable. Multifaceted technological development and societal reforms, critical to minimizing the longer-term impacts of climate change, would likely be de-prioritized. Incentives for states to invest and unilaterally deploy climate-engineering technologies, in attempt to regain control, could rise (Craik 2017). Climate change is a transnational phenomenon and combatting it, by necessity, requires close multi-level international cooperation. Interstate hostility, worsened by climatic conditions, is hardly conducive to successful collaborative climate initiatives.

**Climate Change, Asian-Pacific Security, China and Canadian Prosperity**

Canada has numerous stakes and interests in the Asia Pacific, which include regional stability, deepened economic ties and building stronger partnerships and relationships. To advance its position in the region, the GoC needs to engage in promoting climate security.
Growing security pressures will hinder Asia-Pacific climate action, needed to ensure regional prosperity and security in the twenty-first century. Without effective multilateral institutions and initiatives geared towards environmental security, the region will be hamstrung by state/societal fragility, lowered economic potential and increased likelihood of interstate tension and regional conflict. Canada should work to advance Canadian/Asian Pacific climate security cooperation and take diplomatic initiative. Canadian foreign policy is traditionally focused on multilateralism, moral leadership and conflict mediation — traits advantageous to environmental security action, in both the diplomatic and policy realms.

China is a major player on the international stage and plays an even larger role in the climate security realm. The global mitigation effort will not hit necessary targets without massive PRC emission reductions, and the PRC could seriously hamstring adaption measures across much of continental Asia Pacific. As the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases, the mainland Chinese are of fundamental importance in limiting climate change. Due to its technological progress in renewable technology and vast amounts of financial capital, Beijing has the potential of being a constructive actor in regional environmental security. The return of overt great power competition will undoubtedly generate pressure to bandwagon onto hawkish US positions towards China. Although recent events have demonstrated that the PRC is far from a dependable partner, collaborative climate action is not impossible. Working with American competitors on environmental security issues will likely not cause a US backlash, unlike other policy realms. Lastly, while many states in the Asia Pacific remain deeply skeptical of the PRC’s intentions, others are hedging or reorienting towards Beijing as it asserts its growing power and influence in the region. If Canada wants to play a significant role in the diplomatic conversation on environmental security, the window may be quickly closing.

**Recommendations**

By assisting states in driving positive action regarding climate change with an emphasis on climate security, GAC can further its core international priorities and advance a value-based foreign policy.

1. **Explore Internal GAC Restructuring.** Canadian foreign policy priorities will affect, and be affected by, the security risks of a changing climate. However, in order to fully commit to addressing climate change as a strategic priority, GAC must fully integrate and coordinate attention to the issue across its operations, departments and offices. By prioritizing reducing climate change-related security risks through further elevating, institutionalizing and integrating climate-change and security concerns, Canada can better formulate and advance its policies. An official task force on the Asia-Pacific climate/security nexus could be another effective approach.

2. **Develop a National Strategy for Climate Engineering Research and Governance.** Facing increasingly inhospitable climate patterns, capable states will be incentivized to adopt geo-engineering technology as a stopgap measure to mitigate adverse climate changes. Though precise definition is contentiously debated, geoengineering (GE) is “the deliberate large-scale intervention in the Earth’s climate system in order to moderate global warming” (Shepard 2013). Within international law, no clear contemporary guidelines for appropriate conduct exist. As technological ability advances from the hypothetical to the feasible, tensions between
have and have-not states could result in conflict in the foreseeable future. Canadian leadership in constructing a rules-based framework could help to successfully address the challenges of GE. However, effective global GE governance requires greater knowledge of relevant technologies and their potential impacts. The risks and externalities of GE need to be studied. Despite the increased salience of climate engineering, the issue has largely been absent from the Canadian public policy agenda. A national strategy for GE research ought to be developed, alongside dedicated funding.

3. **Promote Bilateral and Multilateral Climate Change/Security Working Groups.** Canada can demonstrate climate security leadership through engagement with the Asia Pacific on a multilateral and bilateral basis. International working groups on climate change and its regional security implications are critically important. Promoting and organizing track one, track one-and-a-half, and track two collaboration between Canadian and Asian-Pacific subject matter experts will forge a stronger consensus on the security ramifications of climate change and improve coordination and understanding between decision makers. The seemingly inactive Canada-China Climate Change Working Group should be revived. Long-running Chinese issues with the management of its own environment, as well as its military power, make environmental security dialogue even more critical.

4. **Increase the Canadian Climate Fund for the Private Sector in Asia III.** As the GoC attempts to shift the Canadian economy in a carbon neutral direction, it can assist Asia-Pacific states to do the same by increasing the financing and scope of the third round of Canada’s Climate Fund for the Private Sector in Asia. Canadian public and private financing, as well as leveraging Canada’s technological and knowledge-based firms, can help the Asia Pacific develop in a sustainable fashion, reducing short-term financial pressures and increasing the region’s environmental security. As the region is still highly vulnerable to near-term climatic shocks and stressors, Canada can help build best practices concerning climate change adaptation and resilience into regional infrastructure.

5. **Support Joint Naval Disaster Response Exercises.** The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) has been expanding its operations across the Pacific Rim and is prioritizing relationship building with its Asian-Pacific counterparts. The delivery of humanitarian assistance is squarely within the RCN’s mandate, and the RCN has substantial and recent experience in international disaster response missions. Through supporting and participating in joint exercises practicing humanitarian assistance missions, the RCN could pass its valuable experience onto Asian-Pacific partners. These multilateral exercises will advance emerging defence relationships in a non-threatening manner, while assisting regional states to better prepare for extreme weather intensified by climate change.

### About the Authors

**Simon Gonsalves** is a student in Wilfrid Laurier University’s Master of International Public Policy program, based at the BSIA. Simon has served in the Royal Canadian Naval Reserve since 2012.

**Graydon Fleming** is a student in University of Waterloo’s Master of Arts in Global Governance program, based at the BSIA.

**So Youn (Annie) Kim** is a student in the joint-Wilfrid Laurier University/University of Waterloo Global Governance Ph.D. program in University of Waterloo, based at the BSIA.

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Canada’s Contribution to Peace, Stability and the Rule of Law in the South China Sea

Adnan Ali, Kristen Csenkey, Jeremy Loshak and Noor Mirza

**Issue**

Is China complying with a rules-based liberal international order in the context of the South China Sea (SCS)? What should Canada’s role be in the SCS?

**Background**

The SCS is geo-strategically complicated, territorially contested and a resource rich part of the world. The SCS has immense commercial importance, as close to one-third of the world’s total maritime trade flows through it (China Power Project 2019). The national economic security of over a dozen states, including Japan and South Korea, is directly tied to it. Multiple territorial disputes, as those over sovereignty claims, fishing rights and untapped oil and natural gas deposits, are further complicated by American and Chinese active and extended military presence. Any disruption in the SCS is enough to precipitate a global economic crisis, given complex global interdependencies. Questioning China’s adherence to a rules-based order, and Canada’s regional role as a non-stakeholder, is one of careful consideration and deserving prudent analysis.

The dominant international narrative asserts that China continues to flout international law. This is in line with common perceptions of Chinese aggression and expansionist policies in the SCS (Welch 2019). The validity of these narratives and perceptions are, however, questionable. It is paramount to clarify such perceptions as they lead to misjudged foreign policy approaches.

Canada’s Defence Minister, Harjit Sajjan, at the Shangri La Dialogue said, “Canada is — very much — a part of the Pacific community. [And] we will always hold a vested interest in this region’s security, stability, and continuing prosperity” (Sajjan 2017). After a closer look at issues within the SCS, we found that China is in fact complying with a rules-based international order.

First and foremost, as a signatory of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), China’s expansive claim to the whole of SCS has been withdrawn. China has shown more respect for the 200 Nautical Mile Exclusive Economic Zone provision of the UNCLOS — that decisively rescinds their assertion of regional hegemony.

Second, China has reversed its decision to implement an Air Defense Identification Zone in the SCS, as this would be highly provocative, counter-productive and technologically demanding. China has also not landed any aircrafts on their man-made islands in the Spratlys, a disputed archipelago off the coasts of the Philippines, Malaysia, and southern Vietnam in the South China Sea (Welch 2013).

Third, China has done nothing to suggest inconsistency with the Philippines Arbitration Tribunal ruling, including: not creating new military establishments in contested waters, and dropping all references to its famous nine-dash line, a demarcation line used by China to substantiate its claims of the major part of the South China Sea. China has deliberately refrained from showing
Compliance given domestic nationalistic attitudes to keep opinions of the Chinese Communist Party favourable (Welch 2019).

Finally, China has not interfered in any innocent passages or with any American-led Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs), which have dramatically escalated under the Trump administration. It is not in China's interest to have disturbances in the SCS, as their quest for energy self-sufficiency and 64 percent of their total maritime trade is dependent on commodities flowing freely in these waters (China Power Project 2019).

China is an isolated power with no alliance partnerships such as that of the United States and Japan or the United States and South Korea. China-Canada cooperation, based on mutual understanding and trust, can usher in a new era of bilateral relations and act as a bridge to better US-China relations.

Why Should Canada Care?
The SCS matters to Canada because conflict between all parties involved threatens international stability and adherence to a rules-based order. If conflict does erupt in the region, it will have devastating consequences to all economies including Canada's. Although Canada is geographically removed, it has common interests in promoting peace, stability and robust governance. Canada has no claims to the resources in the SCS and has made no pronouncements on sovereignty disputes. This gives us the advantage of being relatively impartial.

Helping to defuse tensions is one way that Canada can play a role in maintaining and strengthening the rules-based international order. Escalation in the tensions between China and the United States marks an opportunity for Canada to provide its expertise and show its commitment to international stability. Faced by challenging diplomatic situations with China, Canada needs to focus on avenues where it can be constructive.

Conclusion
The SCS is both contentious and volatile, which highlights Canada's needs to adopt even-handed policies. Since Canada does not have a direct stake in the SCS, it can adopt a constructive role by facilitating dialogue between the main stakeholders. This should be done to promote peaceful outcomes and provide technical expertise in promoting trust-building measures. China is adhering to a rules-based international order by not obstructing or interfering in US-led FONOPs, by dropping references to the nine-dash line, and by complying with the Philippines Arbitration Tribunal ruling. China's de facto behaviour dispels popular international misperceptions of the threats it poses. While this alone does not resolve tensions, it does signal the need for confidence-building measures. Canada can and should provide functional expertise to reduce tensions between all parties concerned.

Recommendations
1. Canada should not participate in military FONOPS to the SCS. These missions are known to provoke China. By joining US-led FONOPS, Canada would abandon its claims to impartiality and lose its opportunity to facilitate dialogue. Additionally, FONOPS are expensive and would not aid our efforts to bring peace to the region. Canada should and does support its allies in their missions to the SCS; however, this is not an avenue where Canada can be constructive or add value. At present, the Royal Canadian Navy does not participate in FONOPS and it should remain this way. Canada has the opportunity to take a more strategic and diplomatic approach to remain a constructive ally to all parties concerned.

2. Canada should partake in trust-building activities in the region, utilizing already available channels of engagement. Canada cannot and should not be part to any official discussion on maritime jurisdiction in the SCS. Regional issues are best addressed by regional actors. Instead of offering opinions or acting on these divisive issues of sovereignty disputes, Canada should facilitate constructive multilateral relations and dialogue between the concerned parties. This recommendation can be achieved by offering national expertise and knowledge in a number of fields relating to maritime safety and resource management. The goal is to engage in trust-building activities by addressing functional issues. These activities could include, among others:
   - offering official expertise in civil aviation safety;
   - planning joint activities with the Disaster Assistance Response Team;
   - coordinating maritime safety projects, specifically in the field of search and rescue and fisheries management; and
• sharing our knowledge in crisis management strategies.

Through these channels, Canada can open the door to dialogue with China. All countries in the region — including China — should be welcomed to join in these activities. Working together on these projects has a dual purpose of promoting cooperation and resolving issues. Canada's engagement in the region should not be based in deciding territorial sovereignty. Instead, it should focus on developing dialogue and constructive relationships with the aim to reduce tensions in the SCS. Continual dialogue facilitation should be a part of Canada's long-term strategy in the region.

3. Canada should reinvigorate track two diplomacy initiatives in the region, including with China. The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) is a forum for such engagement. It is an informal platform for scholars, officials, experts and other interested parties to discuss political and security challenges in the region. The main goal is to provide recommendations to regional governments and multilateral bodies through dialogue mechanisms, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum. Unfortunately, Canada’s membership and commitment to CSCAP has faltered in recent years. As a founding member of this forum, Canada should recognize the usefulness of this channel and recommit to its membership. CSCAP is the perfect channel for Canada to reinvigorate its commitment to robust governance and peace making through consensus-building and problem-solving initiatives in the region. Participating in track two diplomacy approaches, like CSCAP, reduces misperceptions of threat. Misperceptions, misinterpretation and confusion about maritime jurisdiction and territorial sovereignty between the neighbouring nations in the SCS, leaves room for heightened conflict. This can be mitigated through dialogue mechanisms. A challenging political situation should not deter Canadian engagement in the region; “playing the long game” is important for continued relationship and dialogue building with our partners.

About the Authors

Adnan Ali is a student at the University of Waterloo’s Master of Arts in Global Governance program based at the BSIA.

Kristen Csenkey is a student in the joint-Wilfrid Laurier University/University of Waterloo Ph.D. in Global Governance program based at the BSIA.

Jeremy Loshak is a student in Wilfrid Laurier University’s Masters of International Public Policy program based at the BSIA.

Noor Afsar Mirza is a student at the University of Waterloo’s Master of Arts in Global Governance program based at the BSIA.

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